Intergenerational Equity in Fiscal Policy Reform by Doran, Michael
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2008 
Intergenerational Equity in Fiscal Policy Reform 
Michael Doran 
mdoran@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/917 
 
61 Tax L. Rev. 241-293 (2008) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Intergenerational Equity in Fiscal 
Policy Reform 
MICHAEL DORAN' 
I. INTROOUCTION 
Previous generations have used government fiscal policy to transfer 
resources from themselves to their successors and from their succes-
sors to themselves; current generations engage in similar intergenera-
tional transfers. Policymakers, however, do not customarily evaluate 
the intergenerational fairness of fiscal policy in any rigorous way. This 
follows in part from uncertainty about how to engage the underlying 
questions. By contrast, policymakers generally rely heavily on formal 
assessments of how fiscal policy promotes or undermines fairness 
among members of current generations. They regularly scrutinize tax, 
appropriations, and entitlement decisions to determine whether par-
ticular groups have undue advantages or disadvantages in the distribu-
tion or redistribution of wealth. Although policymakers may hold 
markedly diverse views of what constitutes intragenerational fairness, 
they share a broad consensus about its importance. 
Academics have taken seriously the idea that proper evaluation of 
fiscal policy requires a rigorous assessment of intergenerational eq-
uity, and they have labored 10 provide policymakers wilh analytic 
tools and normative standards to that end. In recent years, public fi-
nance economists have developed and refined formal models for mea-
suring intergenerational effects; most prominent among these are 
"fiscal gap accounting" and "generational accounting."1 Philosophers, 
lawyers, and economists have advanced normative frameworks for as-
sessing intergenerational distributional outcomes. The overarching 
objective of these inquiries is to provide the foundation for evaluating 
the intergenerational fairness of fiscal policy decisions, just as public 
finance theory, legal theory, and political philosophy already provide 
• Associate Professor, University of Virginia School or Law. For guidance on this 
project and helpful comments on drafts, many thanks 10 Alan Auerbach, Lily Batchelder, 
Bill Bratton, Neil Bucbanan. Stephen Cohen , Mitchell Kane. Oaryl Levinson, Ron 
Pearlman , Alex Raskolnikov, J im Ryan , Deborah Schenk, Dan Shaviro, Mark 
Warshawsky, Elhan Yale, and George Yin. Michael Kopp, lIyse Stempler, and Carrene 
Walker provided excellent research assistance. 
I See Section liLA. 
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the foundation for evaluating the intragenerational fairness of those 
decisions. 
This Article argues for skepticism on these points. More specifi-
cally, it argues that the idea of evaluating government fiscal policy 
along the dimension of intergenerational equity is largely misguided. 
In sharp contrast to the intra generational distribution of wealth-
where government policy plays an active and commanding role in 
transferring resources between and among different groups-the in-
tergenerational distribution of wealth is determined mainly by deci-
sions of private actors that [all outside government policy and that 
may blunt or even reverse the distributional effects of government 
policy. Unless a far greater share of intergenerational transfers is 
brought within the scope of government fiscal policy through such un~ 
likely measures as the confiscatory taxation of gifts and inheritances, 
any coherent framework for evaluating intergenerational equity must 
incorporate the total distribution and redistribution of wealth across 
generations, whether determined by fiscal policy, nonfiscal policy, or 
private activity. That leaves little place for drawing informative con-
clusions from isolated analysis of fiscal policy. 
Part II examines the substantial normative problems encountered 
by efforts to evaluate intergenerational equity. Most significant 
among these is the framing problem. Efforts to understand in-
lergenerational equity require the construction of hard but nonethe-
less arbitrary boundaries between different aspects of government 
fiscal policy, between fiscal policy and other segments of government 
policy, and between government activity and nongovernment activity. 
Outcomes that might appear inequitable when considered only as a 
matter of fiscal policy can appear entirely defensible when considered 
against the background of government policy as a whole; but those 
same outcomes might appear inequitable when considered against the 
entire intergenerational distribution of wealth resulting from all gov-
ernment and nongovernment activity. This framing problem distin-
guishes inlergenerational normative inquiries from intragenerational 
normative inquiries. In addition, efforts to evaluate intergenerational 
equity must resolve difficulties presented by the absence of fixed in-
puts and the need to coordinate the demands of intergenerational eq-
uity with basic norms of liberal democracy. Collectively, these 
problems suggest that policymakers should be cautious in treating in-
tergenerational equity as a compelling objective of government fiscal 
policy. 
Part III brackets these normative difficulties to consider the analytic 
problems presented by the formal public finance models for measur-
ing intergenerational effects. As argued there, these models do not 
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provide a full account of how fiscal policy distri butes benefits and bur-
dens across generations, and the parti al account that they do provide 
yields results that are far too incomplete to support robust judgments 
about intergenerational equity. Although these models facilitate 
rough conclusions abo ut the intergenerational effects of particular 
government programs, they do not provide a suffi cient basis for mak-
ing hard evaluative judgments about fiscal po licy reform. 
Part IV examines intergenerational equity from a different ap-
proach. It considers the possibility that pOlicymakers could relegate 
the problem of intergenerational fa irness entirely to the political pro-
cess. Allhough there are obvious difficul ties with this approach- in-
cluding the unavoidable fact that not all interested people can 
participate in the politi ca l process when decisions affec ting them are 
made-it would allow for at least partial poLiti cal resolution of in-
tergene rational questions. In particul ar, the fact of ubiquitous in-
tergenerat ional altruism among overl apping generations suggests a 
limited basis for trusting the political process with intergenerational 
questions no less than with intragenerational questions. 
II. NORMATIVE PItOHLEMS IN A SSESS INC I NTERCENERATIONAL EQUITY 
A conclusion about the equity of particular intergenerational effects 
of government fiscal policy necessarily presupposes a normative ac-
count of intergenerational equity. But any such normative account 
immediately confronts substantial problems. Quite apart from the dif-
ficulty of identi fy ing or establishing consensus about the substantive 
content of equi ty (which presents challenges in both intergene rational 
and intragenerational settings) , attempts to set forth a normative ac-
count of in te rgenerational equity must overcome framing, input, and 
coordination problems. These di fficulties, which are vexing but man-
ageable in the context of intragenera tional equity, present genuine ob-
stacles to assessing intergenerational equity. 
A. The Framing Problem 
There is a basic conundrum in determining what exactl y should be 
included when evaluating intergenerational equity in government fis-
ca l policy.2 This problem is foundational: Any effort to measure and 
then assess the intergenerational effects of government policy requires 
the drawing of clea r but inescapably arbitrary boundaries-such as 
2 The analysis in this Section benefits from Daryl Levinson 's study of common law trans-
act ional frames in const itutional adjudication. See Daryl J . Levinson, Framing Transac-
tions in Constitu tional Law, 11 1 Yale L.J. 13 11 (2002) (arguing that common law 
transactional framing is problematic when dealing with constilUlionallaw issues). 
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between different segments of fiscal policy, between fiscal policy and 
other segments of government policy, or between all government ac-
tivity and alJ nongovernment activity. Ultimately, the most coherent 
and defensible frame is one that does not distinguish between the in-
tergenerational effects of government decisions and the intergenera-
tiona I effects of nongovernment decisions. That expansive frame, 
however, tells us very little about how we should structure or reform 
government fiscal policy to achieve intergenerational equity. Instead, 
it locates the normative question within the realms of moral and polit-
ical philosophy, so that the immediate relevance of government fiscal 
policy is almost vanishingly small. Narrower frames, such as those 
that focus only on discrete government programs, can provide the 
comfort of specific policy prescriptions, but the prescriptions are as 
arbitrary as the frames themselves. 
1. The Narrow Frame of Government Programs 
Perhaps the most obvious point of departure in framing the norma-
tive account of intergenerational equity in fiscal policy is examination 
of specific government tax and transfer programs that have in-
tergenerational effects. Among these, the intergenerational transfers 
under the federal Social SecurityJ program appear compelling. The 
original decision to establish Social Security as a fully funded and 
modest program of "social insurance" was overtaken within a few 
years by a decision to operate the program on an unfunded basis and 
by repeated decisions to expand its scope.4 As a result, the benefits 
paid to early program participants far exceeded the economic value of 
their contributions, and the program redistributed wealth from later 
participants to early participants.s In present value, those intergener-
ational transfers amount to approximately $13 trillion, which is 
roughly the current size of the U.S. economy.6 Additionally, the long-
3 Throughout this discussion, the term "Social Security" refers specifically to the pro-
gram of Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefi ts set fonh in Tille II 
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.c. § 401 et scq. 
4 See W. Andrew Achcnbaurn. Social Security; Visions and Revisions 32-37 (1986); 
Martha Derthick. Policymaking for Social Security 213-92 (979). For additional accounts 
of the original legislation and the development of the program, see generally Arthur J. 
Altmeyer, The Formative Years of Social Sccurity (1966); Edward D. Berkowitz, Robert 
Ball and the Politics of Social Security 164-213 (2003); 1. Douglas Brown, The Genesis of 
Social Security in America (1%9): Jerry R. Cates, Insuring Inequality: Administrative 
Leadership in Social Security, 1935-54 (1983); Wilbur J . Cohen, Retirement Policies Under 
Social Security (1957); Charles McKinley & Robert W. Frase, Launching Social Security; 
A CaplUre-and-Record Account. 1935-1937 (1970); Edwin E. Wine, The Development of 
the Social Security Act 3-108 (1%2). 
5 Achenbaum , note 4, at 32-37. 
6 See note 38. 
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term insolvency of Social Security all but ensures that there will be 
further intergene rational transfers under the program. 
Surely, then, if considerations of intergenerational equity are at all 
relevant to fiscal policy, they are relevant to Social Security. Policy-
makers interested in assessing the intergenerational equity of the So-
cial Security program would want to know what justified decisions 
made in the 1930's and in subsequent decades to impose net burdens 
on the young and unborn for the benefit of the middle-aged and eld-
erly. Similarly, policymakers who consider possible program reform 
today would want to understand the obligations of current partici-
pants to future participants. But however intuitively attractive those 
questions may seem, they are the wrong questions to ask. To under-
stand why, it is necessary to consider the conventional account about 
Social Security and intergenerational equity more closely. 
Social Security, the federal government's largest program for redis-
tributing wealth,7 provides retirement, survivor, and disability benefits 
to nearly 50 million participants and their beneficiaries.s The taxes 
that finance the program comprise employment taxes on the earnings 
of most employed and self-employed individuals9 and income taxes on 
the benefits of certain program participants. to The federal govern-
ment accounts for these taxes through two trust funds. t l The trust 
7 Congo Budget Office, The Long-Term Budget Outlook 19 (2005), available at http:{/ 
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/69xxJdoc6982112-15-LongTermOutlook.pdf; C. Eugene Steuerle & 
Jon M. Bakija, Retooling Social Security for the 21st CenlUry: Right and Wrong Ap-
proaches to Reform 91 (1994). 
8 The 2008 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survi-
vors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds, H.R. Doc. No. 1l0- 104, at 2 
(2008), available at hltp:llwww.ssa.gov/OACffTRffR08l1l{)8.pdr. 
9 Employees and their employers pay a combined tax equal to 12.4% of employee earn-
ings. IRC §§ 3101(a), 3111(a). Although the tax nominally is imposed separately on em-
ployees and employers, employees ordinarily bear the full cost of the lax through lower 
wages. Peter A. Diamond & Peter R. Orszag, Saving Social Security; A Balanced Ap-
proach 24 (2004). Self-employed individuals pay a tax equal to 12.4% of earnings. IRC 
§ 1401(a). One-half of the 12.4% tax paid by the self-employed individual is deductible for 
purposes of the federal income tax. IRC § 164(f). The deduction makes the effective tax 
rate on the self-cmployed individual JUSt under 12%, and the exclusion of the employer's 
share of the 12.4% tax from an employee's income makes the effective tax rate on the 
employee just under 12%. See Daniel Shaviro, Making Sense of Social Security Reform 11 
(2000). In all cases, earnings are taxed only up to a maximum amount set by sta tute. lRC 
§§ 3121(a)( I), 1402(b)(I). 
10 Up to 50% of benefi t payments become includible in gross income if the sum of an 
individual's (or married couple's) modified adjusted gross income and one-half of the indi-
vidual's (or married couple's) Socia l Securi ty benefits exceeds $25,000 (or $32,000 in the 
case of a marr ied couple). IRe § 86. Separately, a portion of benefi t payments received 
by a non resident alien is includible in gross income (subject to contrary treatment under a 
bilateralt:!x treaty). IRC § 871(a)(3). 
11 42 U.S.c. § 401 (a) (creating the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund 
and appropria ting employment tax reven ues to that fund); 42 U.S.c. § 401(b) (creating the 
Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund and appropriating employment tax revenues to 
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funds, which consist of accounting entries on the general books of the 
U.S. TreasurY ,12 se rve as the only source of program benefits.13 
Through the payment of cash benefits to program participants and 
their beneficiaries, Social Security mitigates the risk that retirement, 
death , or disability will result in lost or reduced income. Retirement 
benefits are determined as a function of the participant 's earnings,14 
are payable both to the participant and to the participant's spouse,lS 
and are indexed for changes in the cost of Iiving.16 Survivor and disa· 
bility benefits generally are determined under modified versions of 
the benefit formula used for retirement benefits.17 
As first enacted in 1935, the Social Security program did not envi-
sion significant intergenerational red ist ribution. The Social Security 
Act of 1935 18 provided for tax collections to begin in 1937 but delayed 
benefit payments until 1942. 19 The prefunding of the program drew 
criticism from both the political left, which objected to the modest 
that fund); Social Security Amendments of 1983. Pub. L No. 98·21 § 121(e). 97 Stat. 83 
(appropriating income tax revenues under IRC § 86 and IRC § 871(a)(3) to the trust 
funds). See generally Congo Research Service. Social Security: The Trust Fund (2005). 
available at h t tp:lffpc.state .gov/documen ts/organization/51264.pdf. 
12 Although they do not hold assets separate from the other assets of the U.S. Treasury. 
the (rust fu nds do meaSure the capacity of the Social Security program to make benefit 
payments as they become due. See genera1\y Shaviro. note 9, at 88·90. As with benefit 
payments, the administrative costs of Social Security are charged against the trust funds. 
42 U.s.c. § 401 (g). Amounts credited to the trust funds in excess of current obligations are 
used to acquire Treasury securit ies backed by the full faith and credit of the United States. 
42 U.S.c. § 401(d). Interest and redemption proceeds from the securities arc used for 
program Obligations or are re invested in additional Treasury securities. 42 U.S.c. § 401(f). 
13 42 U.s.c. § 401(h). 
14 A participant's Social Securi ty benefits are determined by reference to her "primary 
insurance amount" ("PIA "). 42 U.S.c. § 415(a). The participant's PIA, in turn, is deter· 
mined by reference to her "averaged indexed monthly earnings" ("A IME"). 42 U.S.c. 
§ 415(b). AIME is the average of the participant's indexed monthly earnings for her 35 
years of highest earnings. Id. 
15 42 U.S.c. § 402(b) (wife's benefits); 42 U.S.c. § 402(c) (husband's benefits). A minor 
or disabled child of a panicipant who has begun to receive retirement benefits is also eligi· 
ble for benefi t payments. 42 U.S.c. § 402(d). Aggregate benefit payments 10 a fam ily 
based on the earnings of a single part icipant are subject to an overall cap. 42 U.S.c. 
§ 403(a). 
16 42 U.s.c. § 415(i). 
11 Survivor benefits consist of a small single.sum payment, 42 U.S.c. § 402(i), and 
monthly benefi t payments; the monthly benefits are payable to the deceased participant 's 
surviving spouse, 42 U.S.c. § 402(e)·(g), minor or disabled child, 42 U.S.c. § 402(d), and 
dependent parent, 42 U.S.C § 402(h). Disability benefits are payable to a participant who 
becomes disabled prior to reaching full retirement age. 42 U.s.c. § 423. A disabled par· 
ticipanl's spouse and minor or disabled chitd also receive benefit payments. 42 U.s.c. 
§ 402(b)·(d). Both (he survivor and disabili ty benefits are indexed to changes in the cost of 
living, 42 U.S.c. § 415(i), and are subject 10 per famil y limits, 42 U.s.c. § 403(a). 
18 Pub. L. No. 74·271 , ch. 531, 49 Sta t. 620. 
19 Derthick, nOie 4, at 213· 14, 429. 
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benefits,2o and the political right, which objected to the accumulation 
of large resources under government control.21 For this reason, Con-
gress adopted the Social Security Act Amendments of 193922 to put 
Social Security on an unfunded (or "pay-as-you-go") basis. Under 
that legislation , Congress effectively spent down the substantial antici-
pated program reserves, before they had accumulated, by making ben-
efits more generous for early program participants.23 Congress 
further expanded program benefits throughout the 1950's, 1960's, and 
early 1970'S.24 Not until legislation in 1977 and 1983 did Congress ap-
preciably reduce progra m benefits.25 
Conventional analysis argues that the consequence of the 1939 leg-
islation and subsequent program expansions was the redistribution of 
wealth across generations.26 Because benefits paid out of the program 
are financed only by taxes paid into the program and interest on those 
taxes, Social Security functions as an e laborate set of zero-sum trans-
actions.27 If any participant receives benefits that exceed the eco-
nomic value of her contributions, a second participant must receive 
benefits that fall short of the economic value of his contributions by 
an amount equal to the excess benefits received by Ihe fi rst partici-
pant. If the second participant does nOI bear that cost, it must be car-
ried as a program debt and passed on to a third , fo urth, or later 
participant . As with any debt , the cost to whomever pays for the ex-
20 Achenbaum, note 4, at 30. 
21 Id. a t 30; Derthick, note 4, at 90-91, 143; Altmeyer, note 4, at 88-89. The program was 
expected to accumulate to $47 bill ion by 1980. Derthick. note 4, at 232-33; Altmeyer, note 
4, at 88. 
22 Pub. L. No. 76-379, ch. 666, 53 Slat. 1360. 
:0 Achenbaum, note 4. at 3. 32. Specifically, Congress added benefits for the spouses 
and dependents of retired participants and for the survivors of deceased participants, 
amended the benefi t formula to increase benefit s for many early participants, deferred an 
increase in employment taxes, and accelerated the payment of the firs t program benefits 
from 1942 to 1940. Achenba um, note 4, a t 32-33; Derth ick, note 4, at 47, 214, 236, 429. 
24 Achenbaum, note 4, at 38-60; Derthick, note 4, at 429-32. 
25 Achenbaum, note 4, at 67-74, 81-99; see the Social Secu ri ty Amendments of 1977, 
Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1509 and the Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 
98-21, 97 Stat. 65. For a history of the 1977 legislat ion, see Derthick, note 4, at 381 -411; for 
a his tory of the 1983 legislation . see generally Paul Light, Artful Work: The Polit ics of 
Social Security Reform (1985). 
16 See Cong. Budget O ffice, The Outlook. for Social Securi ty 18 (2004), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocsl55xx/doc5530106-14-socialsecurity.pdf. See generally Peter A. 
Diamond, Social Securi ty Refonn 65-66 (2002) (stat ing that design of Social Security in 
early years caused a large redistribution to ini tial cohorts of reti rees); Michael J. Bosk.in, 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Douglas J. Puffert & John S. Shoven, Social Security: A Financial 
Appraisal Across and Within Generations, 40 Nat'l Tax J. 19.22 (1987) (s tat ing that Social 
Securi ty "has been a major vehicle for transferring resources from the younger, richer, 
working generation to the older, poorer, retired generat ion"). 
27 Sylvester J. Schieber & John S . Shoven, The Real Deal: The History and Future of 
Social Security 11 2-13 (1999). 
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cess benefit received by the first participant will be the original 
amount of the excess plus interest for the intervening period. But be-
cause the net transfer has been made, the question is not whether but 
by whom it will be borne.28 
The repeated expansions of Social Security effected precisely this 
result. Under the 1939 legislation, the program immediately began to 
pay windfall benefits~that is, benefits exceeding the economic value 
of taxes-to early participants.29 Subsequent legislation both in-
creased the amount of these windfall benefits and broadened the 
group that received them.30 The magnitude of the windfalls is appar-
ent from the high internal rates of return that early participants exper-
ienced on their program taxes.3 ! The cohort born in 1880, which 
reached age 65 in 1945, experienced a 25% rate ofreturn on its Social 
Security taxes; the cohort born in 1890, which reached age 65 in 1955, 
experienced an 18% rate of return; and the cohort born in 1900, which 
reached age 65 in 1965, experienced a 12% rate of return .32 In some 
cases, program benefits were sufficient to effect a full refund not only 
of lifetime employment taxes, with interest, but also of lifetime federal 
income taxes.33 
The windfall benefits for early program participants were financed 
(as a cash flow matter) by participants who were actively working and 
paying employment taxes and who were accruing benefit claims in 
28 Diamond & Orszag, note 9, at 4 ("[OJnce that debt is determined, its COSt cannot be 
avoided: the only issue is how we finance that cost across different generations."); see also 
John Geanakoplos, Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Zeldes, Social Security Money's Worth 
4·16 (NBER Working Paper No. W6722, 1998), avai lable at http://www.nher.org/papersl 
w6722. 
29 See Achenbaum, note 4, at 32-37. 
](I Diamond & Orszag, note 9, at 37; Steuerle & Bakija, note 7, at 108. 
31 Geanakoplos e t al.. note 28, at 4-5 ("The real 'internal rate of return' is the inflation-
corrected discount rate that equates, for each individual, the present value of the stream of 
social security benefits to thc present value of the stream of the taxes paid. "). 
32 Dean R. Leimer, Cohort-Specific Measures of Lifetime Net Social Security Transfers 
(Social Security Administration Office of Research and Statistics Working Paper Series 
No. 59, 1994), al 16, available at hup:llwww.socialsecurity.gov/policy/research_sub41.html 
[hereinafter Leimer I]. Note that these are real rates of return, that they have been calcu-
lated only as to the old-age and survivors insurance componcnt of the program, and that 
the values presented in the text have been rou nded. Many of the results reported in 
Leimer I have been updated in Dean R. Leimer, Cohort-Specific Measures of Life time 
Social Security Taxes and Benefits (Social Security Administration Office of Research and 
Statistics Working Paper Series No. 110, 2007), available at hnp:lfwww.ssa.gov/policy/docsl 
workingpaperslwpllO.pdf [hereinafter Leimer IIJ. The methodology in Leimer II diverges 
(rom the methodology of Leimer I. Leimer II, supra, at 50·52. The results under Leimer 
II, however, for cohorts born before 1940 generally follow quite closely the results (or 
those cohorts under Leimer I; by contrast, the resul1s "for the moot distant [future] cohorts 
differ substantially" between Leimer II and Leimer I. Id . at 53-54. 
3) Steuerle & Bakija , note 7. at II I 
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their own righl.34 Once those younger participants became eli gible for 
benefits, their benefit payments in turn were financed (as a cash flow 
matter) by their own successors' taxes.J5 As the program has moved 
forward, each participant has received the benefits promised to her, 
but the cost of the windfall benefits to the early participants has never 
been paid off. J6 In fact, it has on ly increased through con tinued pro-
gram expansion and accumulating inte rest.37 As of 2008, Ihe unpaid 
cost of the implicit debl attributable to ea rly program participants 
stands at approximately $13 triliion.J8 
Well-reasoned estimates locate the turning point from net transfers 
out of the program to net transfers into the program wilh the cohort 
born in 1938.39 That is, previous cohorts have received and will re-
ceive more from the program than the economic va lue of their taxes, 
but the 1938 cohort and succeeding cohorts have rece ived and will 
receive less than the economic va lue of their taxes.40 Thus, as com-
pared to the 25% internal rate of return enjoyed by the 1880 cohort, 
the 1938 cohort will have a rate of return of less than 3%.41 The co-
hort born in 1960 is projected to rece ive a 2.5% rate of return, and the 
cohort born in 1990 is projected to receive a 2.6% rate of return.41: 
For cohorts born through 2038, the rates of return remain below 3%.43 
To put the point in different terms, for program participants born after 
the Second World War, 33 cents of every dollar in employment taxes 
finance their own Social Security benefits (assuming a market rate of 
:w Diamond & Orszag, note 9, at 37. 
)j Shaviro, nOte 9, at 25-26 . 
.l6 Schieber and Shoven argue that the low ratio of beneficiaries to ac tive workers during 
this era racilitated benefit expansion precisely because the active workers would nOt expe-
rience the full burden or the increased benefit obligations. Schieber & Shoven, note 27, at 
96-97. Simila rly, Derthick argues that the fact thllt "(nJearly all of the early participants 
have later received far more than they had paid in taxes" reinforced poli tical inclinations 
toward program expansion. Derthick, note 4, at 6, 8. 
]7 Leimer I, note 32, at 43. 
}8 See Diamond & Orszag, note 9, at 72 (estimating implicit debt at $11.6 trillion as of 
2004); Geanakoplos etlll. , note 28, a t 21·22 (estimating implicit debt at $9.7 trillion as of 
1997). Adjusting those estimates by the consumer price index for the intervening peri-
ods-admittedly, a very rough method for updating the values-puts the amount at just 
about $13 trillion for 2008. 
39 Leimer I, note 32_ at 30, 71; Diamond & Orszag. note 9, at 70-72. 
40 Diamond & Orszag, note 9, at 37, 208-09; see also Geanak.oplos ct aI., note 28, at 6-7. 
Leimer II, however, locates the turning point at the cohort born in 1932. Leimer II, note 
32, at 60. 
41 Leimer I, note 32, at 69, 71; Lei mer II , note 32, at 61. 
42 Leimer II, note 32, al 61-62. The projccted rates of return ror the 1960 and 1990 
cohorts are almost certainly tOO optimistic: in both cases, it has been assumed (deliberuely 
but counterfaclually) thai there will be no increase in program taxes or reduction in pro-
gram benefits to ensure long-term progra m solvency. Id. at 59 
4] Id. at 63. Again, this assumes no increase in program taxes or reduction in program 
benefits. 
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return) ; the remaining 67 cents represent a pure tax to finance the 
transfers made to earlier participants.44 Through below-market inter-
nal rates of return, participants born after 1937 service the debt in-
curred in the transfers to participants born before 1938. Because of 
the zero-sum nature of the program, the total burden imposed on the 
participants born after 1937 ultimately must equal the $13 trillion of 
windfall benefits paid to the participants born before 1938,45 
lntergenerational redistribution under Social Security is not purely 
historical; the long-term financial instability of the program effectively 
ensures that the re will be additional transfers among current and fu-
ture generations. Although Social Security is solvent in the short 
term,46 all long-term measures unambiguously indicate that the pro-
gram is not solvent over the next 75 years.41 Congress could respond 
44 Steven Caldwell, Melissa Favreaull, Alia Ganlman, Jagadeesh Gokhale, Thomas 
Johnson & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Social Security's Treatment of Postwar Americans. 13 
Tax PoI 'y & Econ. 110, 112, 134 (1999). 
45 John Geanakoplos, Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Zeldas, Social Security: In What 
Form?, in Framing the Social Securi ty Debate 113, 146 (R. Douglas Arnold, Michael J. 
Graetz & Al icia H. Munnell eds .. 1998) ("[iJnevitably, cohorts born after 1937 must give up 
in the aggregate thc whole" amount provided as windfall benefits to cohorts born before 
1938). Leimer, however, notes strong reservations about such conclusions. Hc argues that 
the "legacy debt concept and measure are crit ically sensitive to the choicc of the interest 
rate sedes deemed appropriate for the eva luation of program outcomes" and that "the 
typical practice lin the literature] of using the trust fund or other market inlerest rate unad-
justed for risk ... may produce a quantitatively misleading or even qual itatively invalid 
indication of any 'debt ' or 'burden' imposed by the program on present and future co-
horts." Leimer II , note 32, at 58. Although it might be appeal ing to argue tha t legisla tors 
were unaware of these intergenerational effects in the early years of the program, those 
effects in fact have long been recognized. M. Albert Linton, an insurance execut ive, urged 
the first Social Security Advisory Council during the late 1930's not 10 impose net burdens 
on future generations. Derthick, note 4, at 234-35. Representative John Byrne objected to 
the 1950 expa nsion of the program on the basis of the intergenerational redistribution that 
would result . Id. at 45. He pointedly asked on the House floor how policymakers could 
justify imposing tax rates on future generations thai they would not be will ing to impose on 
current generat ions. Id. at 241-42. In their 1950 study, twO Brookings analysts detailed the 
substantial intergenera tional redistr ibution under the expanding program. Lewis Meriam 
& Karl T. Schlotterbeck, The Cost and financing of Social Security 173-76 (1950). 
46 Trustees, note 8, at 2, 7, 32-42. 
~1 Under the principal long-term measure-the ca lculat ion of "actuarial balance"-Ihe 
trust funds are projected to be exhausted in 204 1: at that time, the program no longer will 
be able to make full benefit payments. Trustees, nOle 8, at 2-3, 43, 53. Instead, benefit 
payments will have 10 be reduced 10 78% of promised benefits (and will fall aga in in 2082 
to 75% of promised benefits). Id. at 8, 18. This 75.year actuarial defici t could be closed by 
an immediate and permanent increase in Social Securi ty taxes of 1.7 percentage points, an 
immediate and permanent reduction in Social Security benefits of 11.5%. or immediate 
transfers from the government 's general fund of $4.3 trillion. Id. at II, 18,58. If the same 
assessment of actuarial balance were made over the infinite fut ure, the actuarial deficit 
would require an immed iate and permanent increase in Social Security taxes of 3.2 per-
centage points, an immediate and permanent red uction in Social Security benefits of 
19.8%, or immediate transfers from the government's general fund of $13.6 trillion. Id. at 
13,58. The other long·term measures- the "closed group unfunded obligation" and the 
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to the financial instability either by enacting or failing to enact legisla-
tive reform of the program; in either case, further inter generational 
transfers under the program are all but inevitable. 
In the absence of legislative reform, there will occur a time in the 
middle of this century when benefits due under Social Security will 
exceed the sum of trust fund assets and program revenues. At that 
point, program administrators would not have the legal authority to 
make full benefit payments;48 instead, they would have to reduce ben-
efit payments by at least 22%.49 These reductions would lower the 
amounts received by retired participants; the reductions, however, 
would not reduce the amounts paid into the program by those partici-
pants. Thus, the primary effect of the reductions would be to impose 
larger program burdens on participants receiving benefits at or after 
the middle of the century. By contrast, participants who have re-
ceived benefits in the past or who are receiving benefit payments to-
day would bear none of the cost of program insolvency. 
Any legislative reform intended to prevent or mitigate insolvency 
necessarily would involve a reduction in program benefits, an increase 
in revenues , or a combination of tbe two. For example, Congress 
could decide to prevent insolvency through a one-time lump-sum tax, 
payable by participants then subject to employment taxes, equal to the 
entire program shortfall; this would impose the full burden of insol-
vency on one or two generations alive and working at the time the tax 
"open group unfunded obligation"-also indicate program insolvency. rd. a t 60-63. None-
theless, there 1I re crit ics who argue that program sustainabili ty is not presently in question. 
See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security and Government Deficits: When Should we 
Worry?, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 257,288 (2007) ("the purported long-term challenges facing 
Social Security either are un likely to occur or at least do not require immediate action to 
address possible fu ture problems"); Dean Baker & Mark Weisbrot, Social Securi ty: The 
Phony Crisis 21-37 (1999) (arguing that the standard projections provide no basis for seri-
ous concern about the program's fi nancial survival) . 
.s The Social Security Act provides that benefits may be paid only from the trust fund s. 
42 U.S.c. § 401(h). The Antideficiency Act prohibi ts any offi cer or employee of the fed· 
eral governmen t from making or authorizing any expenditure or obligation that exceeds 
the amount available through an appropriation or fund . 31 U.5.c. § 1341(a)(t)(A). Some 
have argued that, in the event of trust fund exhaustion, participants would have a cause of 
action against the government for unpaid benefits. See generally Kathleen Romig, Congo 
Research Serv., Social Security: What Would Happen if the Trust Funds Ran Qut? (2007). 
That point is interesting but irrelevant: Because the courts lack constitutional authori ty to 
make federal appropriations, a declarative judgment that a participant is entitled to fu ll 
benefits would have nO effect absent an additional appropriat ion by Congress to fund 
those benefits. See generally Thomas J. Nicola, Whether Entitlement to Full Social Secur-
ity Benefits Depends on Solvency of the Social Security Trust Funds if Congress Does Not 
Change the Law, Congo Research Servo Memorand um (1998), in Social Security Reform: 
Hearings Before the Task Force on Social Security of the H. Comm . on the Budget, l06th 
Congo 223·28 ( \999). 
49 Trustees, note 8, at 8, 18. 
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is imposed.5o At the other extreme, Congress could cancel the pro-
gram outright-collecting no additional taxes and paying no addi-
tional benefits. This would place the full burden on the participants 
(many of them elderly) who would have paid taxes into the program 
but would not yet have received their full scheduled benefits.S] Re-
lated but less extreme reforms could include a long-term increase in 
employment taxes, a long-term decrease in benefits, or a combination 
of the two. The intergenerational incidence of these reforms would 
depend on the exact terms of the tax increase or benefit decrease, but 
plainly different generations would be affected differently. 
2. The Brouder Frames of Government and Nongovernment 
Activities 
As illustrated by the substantial intergenerational transfers that 
have occurred and likely will occur under Social Security, the narrow 
frame of government programs yields results that appear normatively 
relevant to the question of intergenerational equity. The legislative 
expansions of the Social Security program that began soon after its 
enactment transferred resources roughly equal to the present size of 
the U.S. economy from participants who were not then able to partici-
pate in the political process to participants who were in full control of 
their political destiny through their eJected representatives. The ap-
parently self-seiving redistribution of wealth seems to provide a com-
pelling example of intergenerational inequity and a strong caution 
about reforms that might be undertaken by current generations to 
prevent or mitigate program insolvency later in this century. 
But that normative conclusion is contingent on the selection of the 
analytical frame, and the selection of the analytical frame is funda-
mentally arbitrary, inherently skewed, and certainly wrong. Social Se-
curity, like other aspects of government fiscal policy, does not exist in 
isolation.52 The collection of employment taxes and the payment of 
Social Security benefits are not the only tax and transfer interactions 
between program participants and the government. Instead, fiscal 
policy sets up myriad points of contact between government and indi-
viduals, and there is no reason-apart from pure semantics~to ex-
so Geanakoplos et aI. , note 28. at 39-40. 
~1 Id. 
~2 Most government transfer and spending programs arc not even self-financed in the 
manner of Social Security. Although Social Security benefits and administrative costs are 
funded by dedicated employment and income taxes, most other programs- such as food 
stamps, Medicaid, national defense, and scientific research- are funded at least in part by 
general government revenues. Moira Herbst, How Uncle Sam Spends Your Tall Money, 
Bus. Week Online, Apr. 13, 2007, available al hltp:llwww.businessweek.comlbwdaily/dn. 
nashfco ntentlapr2007/db200704 13_898070.htm. 
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amine only some of these points when assessing intergenerat ional 
fairness. It makes little sense to conclude-as has been argued ve ry 
forcefullySJ-that the first generation born after the Second World 
War was treated unfairly by Social Security if, taking a broader per-
spective, it becomes clear that Medicare benefits, government-fi-
nanced research in gerontological medicine, preferential treatment for 
senior citizens under the federal income tax, and other aspects of gov-
ernment fiscal policy offset the net burden under Social Security. The 
arbitrariness of the narrow frame becomes self-evident when one con-
siders that the assessment of Social Security as intergenerationally fa ir 
or unfair could change entirely if Congress simply re-labeled the pro-
gram to include other aspects of government fiscal policy that provide 
net benefits to the seemingly disfavored cohorts: Suddenly, net pro-
gram losers could become net program winners as the direction of 
intergenerational transfers changed with the new boundaries between 
Social Security and othe r programs. 
That suggests that framing the normative assessment of intergenera-
tional equity must include all aspects of government fiscal policy.54 
But thi s remains insufficient. The broadened frame sti ll sets arbitrary 
boundaries that leave out aspects of government policy relevant to 
any sensible evaluation of intergenerational equity. For example , 
analysis under a "total fiscal policy" frame finds that the generations 
born prior to the Second World War generally were net winners, rela-
tive to the post-War generations. not only under the Social Security 
program but under government fiscal policy as a whole.55 Analysis of 
government fiscal policy, however, does not capture the costs imposed 
and benefits conferred by other aspects of government policy. The 
enormous cont ributions that the federal government demanded from 
these generations during the Second World War do not register as a 
fiscal policy cost to them any more than the freedom and prosperity 
that their wart ime sacrifices provided register as a fiscal policy benefit 
to subsequent generations.56 Government policies that force mem-
3) Laurence J. Kotlikoff. Generational Acoounting: Knowing Who Pays, and When, for 
What We Spend 193-96 (1992). 
s. As discussed in Pari III , fiscal gap and generational accounting attempt to evaluate 
inlergenerational equity using precisely this frame. 
5S Kotlikoff. note 53, at 194-95. 
~ This point has been made specifically as a criticism of generational accounting. See, 
e.g., Richard Goode & c. Eugene Steuerle, Generational Accounts and Fiscal Policy, 65 
Tax Notes 1027 , 1029 (Nov. 21 , 1(94) ("Note in this context (generational accounting] that 
generations that dedicated lives, as well as forgone earnings, to defense of the country are 
not measured as having paid any additional'tax' or having made any additional transfer to 
other generations."); Daniel Shaviro, Do Deficits Matter? 159 (1997) ( ~ [Gleneraliona l ac-
counting is limited to fisca l policy and thus mostly cannot adjust for generational differ-
ences in benefit from the noncash goods and services that the governmcnt provides, in 
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bers of Generation A to fight in battle and then pay outsized public 
pensions to its re maining me mbers have no t obviously favored or dis-
favored Generation A relative to Generarion B, none of whose mem-
bers are conscripted and all of whose members receive smaller public 
pensions. To make the same point by looking forward rather than 
backward , a hypothetica l po licy under which government implements 
immediate and substantial restrictions on carbon emissions might im-
pose considerable costs on current generations and confer considera-
ble benefits on future generations. But any attempt to assess the 
inte rgenerational effects would miss those costs and benefits entirely 
if the frame were limited to government fisca l policy. 
Enlarging the frame to the next aperture does not eliminate the 
anomalies. Arguably, one could attempt to assess the intergenera-
tional effects of governme nt poli cy in its entire ty. That, of course, 
would present real problems of valuing nonpecuniary costs (such as 
compulsory mili ta ry service) and benefits (such as reduced climate 
change) and making such costs and benefits commensurable with each 
other and with pecuniary costs and benefits (such as taxes and transfer 
payments). Even assuming those problems could be overcome, a 
framework broadly defined 10 assess the intergenerational equity of 
all government policy would make sense only by ignoring the in -
lergenerational effects of nongovernment acti vities. If nongovern-
ment inte rgenerational transfe rs were small relati ve to government 
intergenerational transfe rs, it might be possible to posit a cogent and 
meaningful norm of intergene rational equity that addresses only gov-
ernment activities. But nongovernmenl transfers between gene rations 
are far 100 l arge~n to be ignored in a normative account of inte rgener-
ational equit y; it makes as little sense to segment government and 
nongovernment effects in this context as it does to segment the effects 
of one gove rnment tax o r transfer program from another. Even when 
conceived broadly, governme nt policy is only one medium through 
which individuals transfer wealth to or from their successors.58 Al-
though we mighl be able to make interesting observations about how 
current generations treat future gene rations through government pol-
icy, those observations hardly provide a sound basis for making judg-
detriment such as regulatory burden, and in noncash contribut ions 10 the government such 
as conscripted mili tary service:·). 
S1 See notes 78·82. 
58 See, e.g. , Shaviro, note 56, at 160 ("[Elven focusing purely on the overa ll ac tivilies of 
the government provides tOO narrow a focus for assessing generational equity. 
[Glovernment policy embraces only a small portion of the IOta l interaction between pre· 
sent and future generations."). 
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ments about intergenerational equity if we systematically ignore all 
nongovernment activity that complements or offsets those policies.s9 
An expansive frame that encompasses both government activity 
and nongovernment activity, however, cannot yield conclusions that 
deliver any meaningful normative payoff about government policy as 
such. Within this frame, government policy is simply one aspect of 
intergenerational transfers Uust as, by analogy, Social Security is only 
one aspect of government fiscal policy). At that point , the question 
about whether government treats different generations fairly devolves 
into a nearly amorphous question about whether the sum total of 
human history treats diffe rent genera ti ons fairly. Assessing the in-
tergenerational effects of government policy- as opposed to the in-
tergenerational effects of everything-requires a less expansive frame. 
But that less expansive frame would have to treat nongovernment ac-
tivity as exogenous to government activit y; and one would then be 
back into the thick of choosing among narrower and necessarily in-
comple te frames. Any such choice would be arbitrary, and the norma~ 
tive conclusions suggested by the frame would be ultimately 
misleading.60 
Each of the possible frames for evaluating intergenerational trans-
fe rs is problematic, and none presents itse lf as the clear basis for 
meaningful normative conclusions about government fiscal pOlicy. 
The case always can be made that a broader or narrower frame is 
more appropriate, and government programs, policies, or actions that 
might appear equitable to futu re generations when the intergenera-
tional effects within one frame are considered may appear inequitable 
when the effects are considered within a broader or narrower frame.6 t 
59 See, e.g., id. at 153-54. 
60 Shaviro cri t icizes generational accounting as dependent on too narrow an analytic 
frame. See Shaviro, note 56. at 159-60. But rather than rejecting generational accounting 
on that basis, he argues that it is "[plerhaps the best tool for enhancing our understanding 
of who wins and loses [rom al ternative reforms. " Daniel Shaviro, Understanding the 
Generat ional Challenge , 75 Tax Notes 714, 716 (May 5, 1997). Shaviro's answer to the 
framing problem is to widen the scope so that the ques tion of intergenerat ional equity is 
posed as to the "overall nature and amount of what we take and what we leave"- which 
"depends in part on savi ngs rates and net capital formation, construed 10 include human 
capital and all changes to depletable and degradable resources." Shavi ro, note 56, at 164 
(empbasis in original). Again, that very expansive frame cannot yield meaningful norma-
tive conclusions about the intergenerational effects of what government does. Shaviro 
parHy acknowledges this, arguing that the "broad perspective merely describes the scope 
of our normative inquiry; it does nm immediately suggest any answers." Id. Bu t that as-
sessment is too optimistic; what the expansive frame does suggest is that intergenerational 
equity is not a coherent end of government policy as such. 
61 As Levinson puts the point in the context of constitu tional adjud ication, determina-
tions of whether a transaction between government and private ci tizens increases or 
reduces the welfare of the private citizens "depend . .. crucia lly, on which government 
harms and benefits are included wi thin the relevant transaction." Levinson, note 2, at 
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The framing problem can reasonably be set aside where the purpose 
of the inquiry is limited. If all we want to know is the intergenera-
tional effects of the taxes and transfers that fall under the government 
label of Social Security (assuming that this is worth knowing) , we can 
undertake the analysis within that framework. The results, of course, 
are limited by the arbitrary parameters of the analysis. But the fram-
ing problem becomes more significant when the results are intended 
to ground normative conclusions. The judgment that an older genera-
tion unduly benefits under the Social Security program at the expense 
of later generations implies that, to the extent possible, the older gen-
eration should give back its windfall and reverse the inequity. But 
that policy prescription appears fundamentally wrong if a broader 
frame indicates that the older generation on the whole has been 
treated no betler than its successors; and it appears fundamentally 
right if a still broader frame indicates that the older generation has 
benefited at the expense of those successors after all. 
The framing problem is evident in the specific normative accounts 
of intergenerational equity advanced by public finance economists 
and legal scholars analyzing government fiscal policy. These accounts 
necessarily separate fiscal policy from other aspects of government 
policy and from nongovernment activity; in so doing. they necessarily 
ignore many intergenerational effects that bear on the question of 
fairness across generations. Consider the possibility of a "no-transfer 
norm" under which government fiscal policy would result in no in-
tergenerational transfers of wealth.62 This norm has at least a superfi-
cial appeal: It purports to effect equal treatment of all generations 
because it requires each generation to provide exactly for itself with-
out taking resources from any other generation. But the prescriptive 
power of the no-transfer norm is limited by the boundaries of its 
frame: The norm has nothing to say about intergenerational transfers 
made outside government fiscal policy, which may complement or off-
set the effects of fiscal policy and which may correct or exacerbate 
intergenerational inequities in the status quO.63 Not much is achieved 
by maintaining that intergenerational equity requires fiscal policy not 
to tax future generations to pay for consumption by current genera-
tions if other aspects of government policy and private activities-
which by definition fall outside the norm-would have precisely that 
effect. 
1378. For a parallel argument in the context of measuring the intragenerational distribu-
tive effects of tax and non tax policy, see Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Law-
making, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 609. 657, 661 (1995). 
62 Shaviro, note 56, at 152-57. 
63 Id. at t53-54. 
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Laurence Kotlikoff argues that the proper end of fiscal policy in its 
trealment of different generations is "generational balance."64 For 
Kotlikoff, generational balance is achieved when government imposes 
the same net lax burden on each generation.65 Thus, Kotlikoff's ana-
lytic work on generational accounts-which indicates that net tax bur-
dens increased steadily throughout the 20th century and will increase 
further for future generations66-demonstrates, in his view, the in-
tergenerational inequity of current government fiscal policy. Kot-
likoff's position has the virtue of suggesting specific prescriptive 
outcomes: Where generational accounts are out of balance, they 
should be rebalanced either by increasing taxes on current generations 
or reducing spending for current generations.67 But, as with the no-
transfer norm, the payoff of these prescriptive implications is cabined 
by the frame. If government confers benefits on future generations or 
imposes costs on current generations that are not captured in the anal-
ysis-either because the analysis does not incorporate all aspects of 
fiscal policy or because the benefits and costs are provided outside 
fiscal policy or even outside government policy-the mandate that 
government take corrective action to reset the generational balance 
becomes fundamentally suspect. 
Tyler Cowen offers a more expansive norm of intergenerational eq-
uity in what he calls the "principle of growth."68 That principle-
which Cowen grounds in "deep concern for the distant future "69-
would require structuring fiscal policy to maximize the rate of sustain-
able economic growth.1° Thus, he would evaluate policy decisions by 
"simply ask[ing] whether a given policy is likely to increase or de-
64 Kotlikoff, note 53, at 218-1 9; Jagadeesh Gokhale & Laurence 1. Kotlikof[, Genera~ 
tional 1ustice and Generational Accounting, in The Generational Equity Debate 76-82 
(John B. Williamson, Diane M. Walls-Roy & Eric R. Kingson eds., 1999). 
65 Kotlikoff, note 53, at 218-19; Gokhale & Kotlikoff, note 64, at 82·83. 
66 See Section IILA; Kotlikoff, note 53, at 126·30; Gokhale & Kotlikoff, note 64, at 83-
84. 
61 Gokhale & Kotlikofr, note 64, at 82·83; Alan J. Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale & lau-
rence J. Kotlikoff, Generational Accounts: A Meaningful Alternative to Defici t Account-
ing, 5 Tax PoI 'y & Econ. 55 (199 1) (detailing generational accounts as an alternative to 
government deficit accounting and providing alternative solutions for out-of- balance 
generational accounts). 
68 Tyler Cowen, Caring About the Distant Future: Why It Mailers and WhatJt Means, 
74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 5, 16 (2007). It is actua lly not clear what status Cowen contemplates for 
the principle of growth. He refers to it both as a "rough-and-ready rule of policy evalua-
tion" and as "a useful practical rule." Id. at 16-17. 
69 Id. at 13. 
70 Id. at 16. By "economic growth" he means gross domestic product, modified to in-
clude "leisure time, household production, and environmental amenities. " Id. at 17. He 
tempcrs his claim by conceding that sustainable economic growth should not override "in-
violable human rights." Id. 
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crease the rat e of economic growt h. "71 His principle suggests that the 
choice between current and future consumption generally should be 
resolved in favo r of future consumption.72 This would imply that each 
generation should prefer the we ll -being of its successors over itself, so 
that consumption always will be deferred. But, as with the no-transfer 
and generational-balance norms, Cowen's norm encounters the fram-
ing problem. Although Cowen's frame reasonably encompasses more 
than just government fiscal policy, his principle of growth does not 
account fo r the intergenerational effects of nongovernment activities 
that may complement or offset the intergenerational effects of govern-
ment policy. 
These and similar attempts to form ulate a normative account of in-
tergenerational equity for government fiscal policy in particular or 
even for government policy as a whole are thus incomplete. It makes 
little sense to evaluate whether fiscal policy treats different genera-
tions equitably when other aspects of government policy also bear on 
the distribution of benefits and burdens across generations; and it 
makes little sense to evaluate whether government policy in its en-
tirety treats different generations equitably when transfers made 
through the decisions of individuals and nongovernment inst itutions 
complement and offset the intergenerational effects of government 
pol icy.7J Shaviro was no doubt right, then, to suggest that government 
fisca l policy should not be measured against a norm of intergenera-
tional equity.74 He argues that the question of intergenerational eq-
uity in fiscal policy cannot meaningfully be separated from the 
question of how much saving is appropnate ,7S and, on that point, he 
observes that "[t]he most defensible stance" is "skepticism concerning 
71 [d. at 27. 
72 Cowen's treatment of this question is equivocal. See id. at 29-31. 
?l See also Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: lntergenerational 
Distributive Justice and Efficiency, 74 U. Chi. L Rev. 79, 87-88 (2007) (arguing that "it is 
incomplete and potentially misleading to suggest that the present generation does (or docs 
not) have an obligation to a future generation to do one specific thing or another, such as 
cleaning up the environment, conserving nonrenewable resources, or avoiding accumula-
tion of a large debt"). 
74 Shaviro, note 56. at 180-85. Actually, Shaviro is elusive on this point. Shortly after 
publishing his skeptical argument, he suggested in a brief article that "the best course ... 
may be to spread the pain [of fiscal sacrificel widely by requiring all age groups to share it 
in some measure, rather than deeply by making a few pay in full. " Shaviro, Generational 
Challen8e, note 60, at 716. More recently, hc argued that "it is difficult to specify the 
optimal intergenerational distribution policy," but he pointedly declined to dismiss the idea 
of intergenerational equity in fiscal policy as not meaningful. Daniel Shaviro, Reckless 
Disregard: The Bush Administration"s Policy ofCuHing Taxes in the Face of an Enormous 
fiscal Gap, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 1285, 1332 (2(04) [hereinafter Reckless Disregard] . Thus, it is 
not quite clear how deep his skepticism on this point runs. 
JS Shaviro, note 56, at 168-76. 
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any strong claims about the proper level of saving."76 To pose the 
question of intergenerational equity is necessarily to pose a question 
that cannot be answered meaningfully without considering the entire 
distribution of benefits and burdens among generations. Framing the 
question in a way that excludes nongovernment activity necessarily 
yields arbitrary, incomplete, and unreliable outcomes; a norm of in-
tergenerational equity must take account of both government and 
nongovernment activity. In other words, intergenerational equity is 
not a question specifically for government policy; it is fundamentally a 
question of political and moral philosophy. 
It might be objected that this criticism sets an unnecessarily high 
standard for making normative evaluations about intergenerational 
equity. Pushed to the extreme, it suggests that evaluative statements 
about intergenerational equity cannot be made unless one can account 
for all conceivable transfers between and among generations, which is 
plainly not practicable. An alternative position would be to make the 
observations that government fiscal policy does have intergenera-
tional effects (as well illustrated by Social Security) and that it may be 
possible to determine the direction and rough magnitude of those ef-
fects (again as illustrated by Social Security). Those observations im-
ply that, even if we cannot make broad assessments about the 
intergenerational equity of government fiscal policy or government 
policy as a whole, we can make normative evaluations at the margins 
about whether a particular government program or a potential reform 
to a particular government program is more or less equitable in its 
inlergenerational effects. Thus, for example, even if there is not much 
value to labeling the historic intergeneralionai transfers under Social 
Security as fair or unfair, there would be considerable value in assess-
ing the intergenerational fairness or unfairness of increasing employ-
ment taxes rather than reducing retirement benefits as a mechanism 
for addressing Social Security insolvency. 
But that is simply another way of begging the question. Although it 
may be possible, within limits, to make quantitative judgments about 
the intergenerational effects of a particular government program or a 
potential reform to a particular government program, it does not fol-
low that the quantitative judgments can support normative conclu-
sions. To conclude that one course of action-such as increasing 
Social Security employment taxes-is more intergenerationally equi-
table than another course of action-such as reducing Social Security 
benefits-presupposes a normative evaluation about the status quo. 
If the status quo is inequitably skewed in favor of future generations, a 
policy that would shift resources from the future to the present (as 
76 Id. at 184 (emphasis in original). 
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might be the case with an increase in Social Security employment 
taxes) would increase intergenerational equity at the margin; but such 
a change would decrease intergenerational equity al the margin if the 
status quo is inequitable to future generations. Unless one has a 
meaningful account of the intergenerational equity or inequity of the 
status quo, attaching normative value to Ihe particular intergenera-
tional effects of discrete policies or policy reforms remains little better 
than guesswork. 
3. The Frames of Intragellerational Equity 
This framing problem is different from-and more complicated 
than-the framing problems that arise in the context of assessing in-
tragenerational equity. Superficially, the two sets of framing concerns 
seem similar. In both cases, there is an intuitive appeal to assessing 
particular government programs or policies. Thus, just as policymak-
ers may want to evaluate whether Social Security equitably distributes 
resources across generations, they may want to assess as well whether 
Social Security equitably distributes resources within generations (for 
example, from wealthier participants to poorer participants). Simi-
larly, closer analysis reveals that , in both cases, the program-specific 
frame is too narrow. But the ability to make meaningful normative 
evaluations about government policy along the dimension of intragen-
erational equity and the ability to do so along the dimension of in-
tergenerational equity diverge as the relevant frames widen. The 
difference lies in the magnitude and importance of nongovernment 
wealth transfers within and across generations.77 
Most intragenerational redistribution in the United States today oc-
curs through government policy. Although individuals and 
nongovernment institutions undertake a non-negligible amount of al-
truistic intragenerational redistribution (for example, through relig-
ious and charitable organizations), the primary mechanism for 
transferring wealth from the better off to the worse off (or, through 
the depravity of politics, from the worse off to the better off) occurs 
through government programs and policies. Thus, when evaluating 
intragenerational equity, consideration of the distributive effects of 
government policy, without regard to the distributive effects of 
nongovernment decisions, sets a cogent framework for normative 
analysis. By contrast, the intergenerational transfers effected through 
individuals and nongovernment institutions are substantial. Reasona-
ble estimates place the amount of wealth transferred across genera-
71 Particular thanks are due here to Mitchel! Kane for emphasizing the importancc of 
this point. 
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tions through gifts and bequests at over $400 billion each year,78 with 
some estimates expecting cumulative intergenerational transfers to 
reach over $40 trillion between 1998 and 20 52.19 Inherited wealth 
alone represents as much as 80% of total private assets in the United 
States.so Although government programs and policies unquestionably 
effect intergenerational redistribution- the Social Security program 
alone has moved $13 trillion among different generations8t - the size 
and salience of nongovernment intergenerational transfers ind icate 
that government is not the primary vehicle for such redist ribution. 
For whatever reason, individuals exhibit substantially more altruism 
across generations than within generations.82 
The impl ication of this difference between intragenerational trans-
fers and intergenerational transfers is that it is possible to make co-
gent normative evaluations about whether government policy, 
considered a lone, is intragenerationally fair. Assuming that one can 
adequately account for the intragenerational distribution of all rele-
vant benefits and burdens of government policy,83 one can sensibly 
determine whether government policy has been fa ir or unfa ir. Even 
though nongovernment transfers will have been Ie£[ out of the analy-
sis, those transfers are not so large, relative to the government trans-
fers, as to undermine the reli ability of the assessment. But the 
intergenerational context demands that nongovernment transfers be 
taken into account along with the government transfers; indeed, the 
nongovernment transfers likely are more important in this context 
than the government transfers. As emphasized above, however, a 
frame that does not distinguish between the intergenerational effects 
of government policy and the intergenerational effects of private deci-
sions does not yie ld normative judgments specific to government pol-
13 Lily Batchelder, Taxing Privilege More Effectively, in the Path 10 Prosperity: Hamil-
ton Projcct Ideas on Income Security, Education and Taxes (Jason Furman & Jason 
Bardoff eds., forthcoming 2008). 
7'J John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why the $41 Trillion Wealth Transfer Estimate Is 
Still Valid: A Review of Challenges and Questions, 7 J. Gift Planning II (2003). 
!O Laurence J. Kotlikorr, Intergenerational Transfers and Savings, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 41, 
43 (Spring, 1988); see also William G. Gale & John Karl Scholz, Intergeneralional Trans-
fers and the Accumulat ion of Wealth, 4 1. Econ. Persp. 145, 154-55 (Fall 1994) (arguing 
that bequests and inter vivos transfers represent 63% of private assets). Shaviro also em· 
phasizes the substantiality of private intergenerational transfers. See Shaviro, note 56, at 
153-54. 
81 See note 38. 
&2 As Levinson suggested (in conversation),the increases in standards of living from one 
generation to the next reveal significan t intergenerational alt ruism. 
SJ The practical difficulty of that task should not be minimized. 
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ICY. Any conclusions Ihat the frame yields will be conclusions about 
life, not about government.S4 
B. The Inputs Problem 
Normative accounts of intergeneralional equity also face a substan-
tial inputs problem. The contrast to normative accounts of intragener-
alional equity is very sharp here. In the case of intragenerational 
equity , the amount of wealth 1O be distributed and the number and 
characteristics of persons among whom that wealth is to be distributed 
are given or, in any event, can be treated as given. In the case of 
intergenerational equity, neither the amount of wealth [0 be distrib-
uted across generations nor the number or characteristics of genera-
tions are exogenous to the normative questions at issue. Without 
fixed inputs, the exercise of determining the normative content of in-
tergenerational equity quickly becomes a conundrum. 
Begin with the proposition that questions about the fair di stribution 
of wealth require consideration of actual outcomes. Thjs approach 
(whjch can be associated with the argument of Liam Murphy and 
Thomas Nagel concerning tax equity8S) does not inquire how much 
has been transfe rred away from an individual, group, or generation 
relative to what the individual , group, or generation had before the 
transfer, and it does not inquire how much has been transfe rred to an 
individual , group, or generation relative to what the individual, group, 
or generation had before the transfer. Rather, it inquires how much 
54 Two examples from the philosophical literature illustrate the indeterminacy of in-
tergenerational equity when set within such a broad frame. Ja n Narveson appea ls to "per-
son-regard ing utilitarianism" to establish the existence of obligations to future generations. 
Jan Narveson, Future People and Us, in Obligations to FUiure Generations 38-60 (R.I. 
Sikora & Brian Barry eds., 1978). Narveson argues that utilitarianism implies that "what 
we owe to future generations is neither Everything nor Nothing. but merely Something." 
Id. a t 60. By contrast, Robert Elliot (extending Robert Nozick's work) promises that liber-
tarianism implies "extensive obligations to future generations." Robert Elliot, Future 
Generations, Locke's Proviso and Libertarian Justice. 3 J. Applied Phil. 217, 218 (Oct. 
1986). Elliot argues Ihat Locke's proviso about the acquisition of resources-thai "enough 
and as good be left for others"-implies that any individual, "no mailer where the person 
is located historically," has a right 10 "how things would have been for him in the state of 
nature." Id. at 219, 224. Although th is suggests a duty to conserve resources, the duty is 
limited 10 those resources that would have been available in the stal(: of nature - such as 
"clean air. pure water and even aes thetically appealing landscapes. ,. Id. at 224·25. But one 
would be hard pressed to agree that this constitutes an "extensive" obligation to future 
generations. On its face, this duty applies to no pon ion of the siock of human wealth 
beyond natural resources. It implies, for example, that one generation could consume all 
ilS own capital and ailihe capital of the next several generations. As long as the pronigate 
generat ion preserved "clean air, pure water and ... aesthetically appealing landscapes," it 
would discharge its intergenerational obligations. 
8!1 See Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice 3-39 
(2002). 
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an individual , group, or generation has relalive to other individuals, 
groups, or generations after all the transfers have been taken into ac-
count. On this perspective, intergenerational equity requires equita-
ble outcomes under the sum total of distributions across generations 
(much as, on Murphy and Nagel's view, intragenerational equity re-
quires equitable outcomes after taking into account the effects of all 
government taxes and transfers). 
The inputs difficulty arises because any norm of intergenerational 
equity that compares distributional outcomes across generations must 
posit the total amount of wealth available for distribution across gen-
erations. The total amount of wealth available for distribution across 
generations, however, depends on decisions made by each generation , 
and those decisions should depend on the norm of intergenerational 
equity (assuming that the norm is at all relevant). Or, to put the same 
point in slightly different terms, to the extent that anyone generation 
follows its norm of intergenerational equity in determining how much 
to transfer to its successor generations, the amount of wealth available 
for distribution across generations is simultaneously a determinant of 
the normative analysis and a product of the normative analysis be-
cause how much wealth there will be to distribute among all genera-
tions depends in part on how that generation defines its obligations to 
future generations. A normative account that requires nothing more 
than passing to the next generation what was received from the prior 
generation86 implies a smaller sum of wealth available for distribution 
across all generations than does a normative account that requires 
savings for the benefit of future generations.87 
This inputs problem is true not only of the wealth to be distributed 
but also of the number of generations and the characteristics of those 
86 See Subsection III.B.3 (discussing Ackerman's notion of trusteeShip). 
81 See id. (discussing Rawls' just-saving principle). Consider, fo r example. the point 
made by Geoffrey Heal in auempting to establish the proper discount rate for intergenera-
tional effects: 
If .. . future generations are richer than the present generation, then wit hin a 
utilitar ian framework the value of a marginal unit of consumption to them will 
be less than to us. and this will be reflected in the consumption discount 
ra te .... If consumpt ion were to be falling rather than rising over time. this 
effect would go into reverse and future increments of consumption would be 
more highly valued than present ones. The discount rate could be negative. 
Geoffrey Heal, Discounting: A Review of the Basic Economics, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 59, 65 
(2007). The relative wealth of current and future generations is, of course, the point that a 
norm of intergenerat ional equi ty would be meant to resolve. As Douglas Kysar argues: 
"(E)very distribution of resources between generations gives rise to a different market 
equilibrium, including within that equilibrium a resultant market rate of interest that re-
flects the opportunity cost of capital"; thus, where (as in environmental law) the inquiry "is 
concerned precisely with the analytically prior question of resource distribution among 
generations, it does not make sense to hinge such policymaking on thc existing discount 
rate." Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting ... on Stilts, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 119, 130-31 (2007). 
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generations. Derek Parfi! famously argued that "we can easily affect 
the identities of future people" (an element of what he called the 
"Non-Identity Problem"). and he observed that this frustrates our 
ability to ground "beliefs about our obligations to future genera-
tions. "88 Although we might pursue actions that would have bad ef-
fects for future generations (such as depleting natural resources), the 
Non-Identity Problem implies that those actions are "worse fo r no 
one" because our actions, in addition to depleting natural resources, 
will also change the identities of future people.89 By extension, the 
number of future generations, the size of those future genera tions, 
and the relevant characteristics of those future generations derive in 
no small part from decisions made by current genera tions. Just like 
the total amount of wealth available across time, the number and 
identity of genera tions across time cannot be treated as exogenous. 
How many fu ture generations there will be and what those future gen-
erations will have depends on what we transfer to them; what we 
transfer to them depends on what we believe we ought to transfer to 
them; but what we believe we ought to transfer to them depends on 
how many of them there will be and what they will have. 
Contrast the case of intragenerational equity: There, normative ac-
counts effectively can assume that the relevant question is how the 
sum of current wealth should be distributed or redistributed among 
existing persons. Although not known with precision, these can be 
treated as fixed. To use a familiar metaphor, the question can be 
treated as one of how a pie of a given size will be divided among those 
who claim entitlement to a slice. In the case of intergenerational eq-
uity, however, neither the quantum of wealth nor the number of those 
among whom the wealth is to be distributed can be taken as given.90 
To continue the metaphor, both the size of the pie and the number of 
generations with a claim to it are open questions and , in fact , wi ll be 
determined partly by the question of how large each slice should be. 
This does not imply that the normative analysis for intergenerational 
equity is inescapably circular; it does imply, however, that the norma-
tive analysis is very elusive. Approaches and concepts that are Camil-
88 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 377, 451 (1984). 
19 Id. at 361·64. 
90 See Peter Laslen & James S. Fishkin, Introduction; Processional Justice, in Justice 
Between Age Groups and Generations I (Peler Lasletl & James S. Fishkin cds., 1991) 
(arguing that "lP]rinciples of justice, equality, and utility that yield reasonable conclusions 
for fixed popu lation sizes over short periodS begin to produce bizarre results once cohort 
sizes or total population sizes or both vary over time"'); Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell. 
On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and intergenerational Equity. 74 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 171, 200 (2007) (discussing the baseline ethical obligations owed by the pre-
sen! to the future ror comparison to determine any compensatory ac tions that need to be 
taken currently). 
2008] INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY IN FISCAL POLICY REFORM 265 
iar from intragenerational equity break down in the case of 
intergeneralional equity. Intuitively appeal ing distributional norms, 
such as treating everyone the same or equalizing post-distributional 
outcomes, falter in the absence of fixed inputs or points of reference-
when we cannot take as given any particular level of wealth or well-
being of future generations or even the existence of any particular 
future generations. 
C. The Coordination Problem 
Even if one could set out a normative account of intergenerational 
equily that dealt adequately with the framing problem and the inputs 
problem, it still would be necessary to coordinate the requirements of 
intergenerational equity with other normative commitments. James 
Fishkin makes the very powerful point that credible notions of in-
tergenerationa l equity stand in tension with basic principles of liberal 
theory.91 It is not by any means clear that the competing normalive 
demands can be reconciled. 
Consider first the problem of squaring intergenerational equity with 
the basic principle of self-determinat ion. Bruce Ackerman at lempts 
to merge the two in his nOlion of " trusteeship" in "the tiberal sla te.'>92 
Ackerman 's idea of intergenerational equity centers on the argument 
that each generation must "arrange its affairs so as to refrain from 
making members of the next worse off than the present occupants of 
our planet."93 More specificall y, Ackerman argues that, in the liberal 
state, each child is "entitled to an endowment that is no worse than ... 
that provided to any of his age mates ... [and] that obtained by any 
older citizen with whom the younger citizen can converse. "94 In other 
words, the "per capita wealth" of each generation must be "equal to" 
that of its predecessor generat ion.95 This implies that each generation 
has a duty to preserve and transfer to its successors resources suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirement of equal endowments among genera-
91 James S. Fishkin. The Limits of Intergenerational Justice, in Justice Between Age 
Groups and Generations, note 90, al 62, 71 -13. 
92 Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 223 (1980). 
93 Id. at 2 13. 
9t Id. at 2 17. 
'IS Td. at 223. 
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tions.96 This, Ackerman indicates, ensures that those of different 
generations enjoy undominated equality.91 
Ackerman's articulation of the notion that intergenerational justice 
requires equal treatme nt of different generations has considerable ap-
peal; it echoes Fishkin 's observation that " [t]he intuitive idea is that 
justice should be neutral among generational cohortS."98 Still, Acker-
man 's requirement of "equal endowments" suggests that to tal wealth 
like ly would re main stagnant over time. The trusteeship e nvisioned 
by Ackerman merely requires that each generation pass along to the 
next generation the level of wea lth that it inherited.99 Thus, any 
wealth generated by the activities of a generation that exceeds the 
wealth of the initial endowment may be freely consumed by that gen-
eration. If this principle were taken to its limits by each generation , 
the endowment that would pass from one generation to the next 
would be little , if anything, more than what would be found in the 
state of nature .] OO 
More import antly, Ackerman's trusteeship principle does not effect 
the reconci liation of intergenerational equity and " undominated 
equality" that he intends. Ackerman specifically argues that in-
tergenerational trusteeship follows from the "plainest ... obligation" 
of the first generation to pass along its "inheritance" of undominated 
equality; he argues that earli er generations may not exercise the "dis-
tinctive form of power" that " temporal priority gives the old ... over 
the young."]01 In seeking to safeguard the right of a later generation 
to undominated equality, however, Ackerman effectively has forced 
upon the later generation outcomes that it mayor may not actually 
want. Assume, for example, that several generations leave endow~ 
96 In a similar vein. Fishkin suggests as a possible norm of intergenerational equity "a 
requirement of equal per capi ta sacrifice (over the long term) for generationa l cohorts for 
the contributions they are required to make for dependent portions of the population 
(whether those pon ions are for Ihe elderly, the disabled, or the young)." Fishkin. note 91, 
at 72. Similarly, Kotlikoffs notion of intergenerat ional equity requi res the same net tax 
rales for every generation. See Section IV.A. Where Ackerman positS Ihe intergenera-
lional equity norm in terms of equal endowments, Fishkin posits the norm in lerms of 
equal sacrifice and Kotlikoff posits the norm in lerms of equal tax rates. See KOilikoff, 
note 53, at 218-19. Each , however, takes Ihe position that just or fair relations between 
generations demand equal treatment of those born inlo different generations. 
97 Ackerman, note 92, al 224. 
98 Fiskhin, note 91 , a l 72. Cf. Dexter Samida & David A. Weisbach, Paretian In -
lergenerational Discounting, 74 U. Ch i. L. Rev. 145, 153-54 (2007) (adopting the assump-
tion that "intergenerat ional equity requires each generation 10 have the same marginal 
util ity of consumption (or absolute utility, depending on our social welfare function)"). 
99 Ackerman, note 92, at 224. 
100 Ackerman makes clear thai trusteeship does not require a generation to transfer to 
its successors any wealth beyond that received from its predecessor. Acke rman, note 92, at 
224. 
101 Id. at 22 1. 
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ments to their successors that are greater than the endowments they 
inherited; assume, in other words, that the liberal state accumulates 
wealth over time. Assume also that , at a point of economic hardship, 
one generation, Generation M, which has inherited wealth from previ-
ous generations, observes Ackerman's requirement of trusteeship and, 
in acting to ensure equal endowments for successor generations, 
makes substantial sacrifices to its own well-being. Jf on reaching ma-
turity , the next generation, Generation N, regrets the sacrifices made 
by Generation M and expresses a preference that Generation M had 
devoted significantly greater resources to its own well-being, Genera-
tion N will find that Generation M has in fact exercised its "distinctive 
form of power"~not by transferring too few resources to Generation 
N but by transferring too many. 
Thus, if Congress in 1935 had refused to enact President 
Roosevelt's proposal for the Social Security program or if Congress in 
1939 and later years had refused to expand the scope of Social Secur-
ity benefits payable to early program participants, later generations of 
Americans might sincerely regret that so mClny of their predecessors 
li ved their final years in poverty; they might sincerely regret , in other 
words, inheriting a society in which government policy passed a 
smaller program burden forward to later generations but permitted 
widespread deprivation among previous generations. Certainly, a re-
sponse that the earlier generations were acting to preserve the equal-
ity of endowment that future generations should have in a ljberal state 
would fail to persuade the later generations that the earli er genera-
tions had in fact acted properly. 
This reflects Fishkin's point about conflict between intergenera-
tional equity and basic principles of liberal theory.l 02 Although 
Fishkin 's objective is to demonstrate that the demands of intergenera-
tional equity can constrain the liberties of earlier generations (for ex-
ample, the liberty of earlier generations to procreate), the constraints 
also can apply to the liberties of later generations. First generations 
come first, and their actions necessarily affect the world as inherited 
by later generations. Ackerman tries to neutralize the "distinctive 
form of power" that arises from "temporal priority" by insisting on 
equality of endowments,103 but he does so by running roughshod over 
the prerogative of later generations to make their own determinations 
about their own preferences. Only by dictating to later generations 
exact ly what it is that they want from a liberal state that gives them 
"undominated equality" can Ackerman claim to reconcile intergener-
ational duties with liberalism. 
102 Fishkin, note 91, at 62. 71-73. 
!O3 Ackerman, note 92, at 221. 
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Next , consider the problem of reconciling the requirements of equi-
table distribution of wealth across generations with equitable distribu-
tion of wea lth within generations. The reference point here is John 
Rawls, who presents a robust conception of intergenerational obLiga-
tions. I04 As applied to generations over time, Rawls's difference prin-
ciple requires improvement in the "long-term prospects of the least 
favored extending over future generations. "lOS This implies that 
"[e]ach generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and 
civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that have been 
established, . .. but it must also put aside in each pe riod of time a 
su itable amount of real capital accumulation. "I06 This saving must 
continue until just institutions are established; at that point, no new 
intergenerational saving is required, and "a society meets its duty of 
justice by maintaining just instit utions and preserving their materi al 
base."I07 
1n other words, for Rawls (unlike for Ackerman), intergenerational 
justice requires actual saving fo r the benefit of future generations. 
The specific rate-or, more precisely, rates-of such savings would, of 
course, be determined in the original position. lOS Rawls contemplates 
that the savings rates will be dependent on the state of society at vari-
ous slagesY)9 Although "the persons in the original position are to 
ask themselves how much they would be willing to save at each stage 
of advance on the assumption that all o ther generations are to save at 
the same ra tes," the poorer (presumably earlier) gene rat ions will be 
saving at lower rates and the wealthier (presumably late r) generations 
101 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 284·93 (1971 ) (hereinafte r Theory of Justice]; see 
also John Rawls, Political Liberalism 274 (1993) (revising his earlier account of intcrgener· 
at ional juslice). 
lOS Rawls, Theory or Justice, nOte 104, at 285. 
10l'i Id. 
107 Id. at 287. 
1011 Id. Ackennan argues that Rawls' own conclusion here-thai a choice made in Ihe 
original position would yield a positive rate of saving-is inconsislent with the maximin 
approach Ihat runs throughout A Theory of Justice. Specifically. Ackerman argues that 
the "j ust savings" principle would necessarily lead to lower well-being of thc wors t off in 
the earliesl generalions. Ackerman, nOle 92, at 223-25. Ackerman's objection assumes 
that any positive ra te of saving as between an early generation and a la te r generation must 
reduce the we ll-being of every member of the early generation, including the least well-o(f. 
This is by no means necessary, however. A society that observes the progressive redistri -
bution of wealth on an intragenenll ional basis could maintain a steady -or even increas-
ing-level of well-being for its least well·off while still making net contr ibutions to capital 
accumulat ion that allow for inlergeners tional transfers eonsistenl with the JUSt savings 
principle. It does not necessarily follow, Ihen, that those in (he original posit ion would 
ehoose lhe equal-endowment principle of Ackerman's trusteeship over Rawls ' just savings 
principle. 
109 Rawls, Theory of Justice, nOle 104, at 287. 
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will be saving at higher rates. II O Still, this just savings principle would 
always require a positive rate of savings because, in Rawls' view, in· 
tergenerational transfers can be made only from earlier generations to 
later generations. lll 
But that hardly seems right. Societies can and do transfer wealth 
from later generations to earlier generations-as the United States 
has under the Social Security program-by funding payments to ear-
li er generations through the accumulation of debt , whether explicit or 
implicit , that must be borne by later generations.112 To the extent that 
a society uses such later-to-earlie r intergenerational transfers to im· 
prove the position of the least well-off in the earlier generations, it 
would seem to act consistently with Rawls' difference princi ple but 
contrary to his just savings principle. In short, it is not at all clear why 
just savings could not include a negati ve rate of savings in order to 
improve intragenerational justice, and it is not at all clear that, under 
just savings, concern for the " least favored" must necessarily be 
viewed as a "long-term" enterprise. Critica lly, Rawls recogn izes that 
concern for intergenerational justice must be linked to concern for 
intragenerational justice. He minimizes the conflict between the two, 
however, conceding only that the former is a "constraint" on the 
latter}13 
Rawls' efforts to reconcile the just savings principle with the differ-
ence principle underscores the inherent tension between intergenera-
tional equity and intragenerational equity. Obviously, a norm of 
intergenerational equity must provide meaningful guidance on the 
balancing of deferred consumption of wealth aga inst current con-
sumption of wealth. The tension there is obvious: Resources that are 
consumed today cannot also be saved for the future, and resources 
that are set aside for the future cannot also be consumed currently. 
But that also implies a fundamental tension between intergenerational 
equity and intragenerational equity. When current genera tions save 
or otherwise transfer wealth to future generations, the current genera-
tions enhance the well-being of future generations. At the same time, 
however, current generations limit their own abil ity to contribute to 
the well·being of their own members, includ ing those who are least 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 291. 
112 If later generations default on debl incurred by earlier generations to fund benefits 
for those earl ier generations, one or more generations will bear costs from the default. If 
the debl is an explicit debt, evidenced ((or example) by government bonds, default will 
cause the generations alive at and afler the lime of defaul t, 10 Ihe eXlenllhey are creditors, 
10 bear the costs of default and, to the extent they are borrowers, 10 incur higher costs of 
borrowing. If the debt is implicit, as it is with Social Security, default will cause the genera-
tion or generations thaI are lhe obligees of the implicit debl to bear lhe default. 
113 Rawls, Theory of Juslice. note 104, at 292. 
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well-off. Thus, intergenerational obligations potentially interfere with 
equitable redistribution of wea lth among members of current 
generations. 
To the extent they share OUT normalive commitments, members of 
future generations benefit from equitable redistribution within current 
generations. Thus, if me mbers of current generations were to engage 
in no redistribution of wealth in o rder to transfer every available re-
source forward, future generations may be less well -off simply by vir-
tue of the inequalities in the socie ty they inheri t from current 
generations. And yet, resources devoted to redistribution of wealth 
among members of current generations cannot be used for redistribu-
tion of wealth among members of future generations. This simply fo l-
lows from the trade-off between deferred consumption and current 
consumption. Even if greater intragenerational redistribution by cur-
rent generations means that future generations inherit a more just so-
ciety, one cost of that increased redistribution may be greater 
intragenerational inequities in the future. 
Thus, it is not enough for a substantive norm of intergenerational 
equity to balance deferred consumption of wealth against current con-
sumption of wealth; it also must balance that against the demands of 
intragenerat ional equity for current gene rations and the demands of 
intrage nerational equity for future generations. The goals of preserv-
ing resources for our successors and improving the condition of our 
contemporaries yield potentially inconsistent directives. But any sub-
stantive norm of intergenerational equity that fails to take account of 
how a balance between deferred a nd current consumption furthers or 
unde rmines the separate objective of intragenerational equity will be 
incomplete. 
III. ANALYTIC PROBLEM S IN MEASURINC 
INTE:RCENERATIONAL EFFECTS 
Notwithstanding the normative problems presented by efforts to 
evaluate the intergenera tional equity of government fiscal policy, leg-
islators and other policymakers contemplating possible changes to fis-
cal policy (such as Social Security reform) may want to understand the 
inte rgenerational effects of their policy options.114 This inquiry-
measurement of the intergenerational effects of gove rnment fiscal 
policy-can be separated from the normative inquiry concerning 
whether the measured effects are fair. That is, one can attempt to 
quantify how much wea lth is transferred among past, current , and fu-
114 See, e.g., U.S. Treasury Dep'l. Social Security Reform: The NalUre of the Problem 
12-13 (2007), available at htlp:llwww.treas.govfpress/releases/reportslposl.pdf. 
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ture generations (for example, under the Social Security program) 
even if it excludes other relevant aspects of government policy and 
nongovernment activity. This Part takes up the problems presented in 
trying to measure the intergenerational effects of government fisca l 
policy. 
A. Deficit , Fiscal Gap, and Generational Accounting 
In recent years, public finance theory has developed quantitative 
models for determining the intergenerational effects of government 
fiscal policy; the most prominent are fiscal gap and generational ac-
counting. These models respond in part to the inadequacies of con-
ventional deficit accounting. Critics argue that the federal budget 
deficit does not provide reliable information about the actual costs of 
government. 115 As a meas ure of cash flow driven in large part by the 
labels attached to otherwise similar receipts and payments, Ihese crit-
ics see the deficit as inherently manipulable . For example, if the gov-
ernment takes $100 from A in Year 1 and pays $105 to A in Year 2, the 
effects on the federal budget deficit for Year 1 and Year 2 differ signif-
icantly depending on the labels that the government attaches to the 
transactions.11 6 The government could label the $100 receipt in Year 1 
as a "tax" and the $105 outlay in Year 2 as a "benefit ," or it could 
label the $100 receipt as "borrowing" and the $105 outlay as a "repay-
ment with interest. " Under the tax-and-benefit label , the Year 1 
budget deficit is reduced by $100, and the Year 2 deficit is increased 
by $105; under the borrowing-aod-repayment label, the Year 1 deficit 
is unchanged; the Year 2 deficit is increased by $5. The deficit effects 
of the different labels are significant even though the underlying 
transaction is economically the same in both cases.ll7 
The arbitrariness is more pronounced if the receipt from A and the 
outlay to A are separated by a period longer than the government's 
budge t window. 1I8 If the government takes $]00 as a tax from A in 
Year 1 and , at the same time, undertakes to pay $265 as a benefit to A 
in Year 20, deficit accounting will for many years reflect only a $100 
liS Auerbach et aI. , note 67, at 56-57; see also Howell E. Jackson, Accounting for Social 
Security and Its Reform, 41 Harv. J. Legis. 59 (2004) (arguing "(aJccrua l accounting. 
would provide a clearer piclure of the true Slate of the Social Security system's current 
financial shon fall"); KOllikoff. nOle 53, at 18-20. 
116 Auerbach et a l. . note 67, at 56; Kotlikorr, note 53, at 18. 
111 Auerbach e t a l.. note 67. at 57; see KOllikoff, nOte 53, at 19. 
118 Alan J. Auerbach, William G. Gale, Peter R . Orszag & Samara R. Poller, Budget 
Blues: The Fiscal Outlook and Options [or Reform, in Agenda for the Nation I \0 (Henry 
J. Aaron, James M. Lindsay & Pietro S. Nivola eds., 2003) (official budget projections use a 
ten-year window, which does not include a ll the fiscal effects attr ibutable to baby 
boomers.) 
272 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: 
decrease in the Year 1 deficit because the reported deficit will not 
reflect the promise to pay a $265 benefit to A in Year 20 until well into 
the future. Of course, if the obligation to pay a $265 benefit in Year 
20 were discounted to Year 1 at an appropriate interest rate (here, 
5%). the $100 receipt in Year 1 would be offset in full by the $100 
present value of the benefit obligation payable in Year 20. In that 
case, the transaction would have no effect on the deficit. 1I9 
Additionally, deficit accounting fails to identify the intergenera-
tional effects of fiscal policy.120 To see this, assume that the govern-
ment pays a $100 benefit to A t a retiree, in Year 1 and that A's benefit 
is financed by a $100 tax on B, a middle-aged worker , in Year 1. As~ 
sume also that the government promises to pay B a benefit of $265 
once 8 has retired in year 20 and that B's benefit will be financed by a 
$265 tax on C in Year 20, when C is middle-aged. Deficit accounting 
records no change in the federal budget deficit in Year 1 or in Year 20 
attributable to the taxes on 8 and C and the benefits to A and B. In 
Year 1, the government's revenue from B's tax exactly matches the 
government expenditure on A '5 benefit , and so also with C's tax and 
8's benefit in Year 20.121 Deficit accounting thus not only misses the 
deferred benefit obligation incurred by the government; it also misses 
the basic point that this policy has made transfers from 8 to A and 
from C to B. Because A , B, and C are, by hypothesis, members of 
different generations, the fact and extent of the transfers presumably 
are important to policymakers. The point would be all the more sig-
nificant if the benefits paid to the earlier generations (A and B) ex-
ceeded the value of the taxes they have paid~precisely the effect, for 
example, of Social Security. Under deficit accounting, however, that 
redistribution fails even to register as an element of fiscal policy. 
In response to these and other shortcomings of deficit accounting, 
public finance economists have developed other measures of govern-
ment fiscal policy-most notably, fiscal gap accounting and genera-
tional accounting. Both fiscal gap and generational accounting begin 
with the government's intertemporal budget constraint-the premise 
that, ultimately, aggregate government spending cannot exceed the 
sum of net government assets and aggregate government revenues;122 
119 See Kotlikofr, nOle 53, at 143-49; David M. Cutler, Book Review of Generational 
Accounting, 46 Nat'l Tax J. 61, 62-63 (1993). 
110 Auerbach et al., nOle 67, al 56-57; Shaviro, Reckless Disregard, note 74, at 1290; see 
also Congressional Budget Office, Who Pays and When? An Assessment of Generational 
Accounting 2-3 (1995), available at hllp:lfwww.cbo.gov/ftpdocslOxxldocl81Genattl.pdf. 
121 See generally Auerbach et al ., note 67, at 57. 
122 Alan J. Auerbach & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, The Methodology of Generational Ac-
counting, in Generational Attounting Around the World 31 (Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence 
J. Kotlikoff & Willi Leibfritz eds., 1999); Jagadeesh Gokhale & Kent Smelters. Fiscal and 
Generational Imbalances: New Budget Measures for New Budgel Priorities 7 (2003) (stat-
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and both fisca l gap and generational accounting posit , counterfactu-
ally, the indefinite continuation of current fiscal policy.123 Fiscal gap 
accounting adds the present value of projected government receipts to 
the current value of government assets and subtracts that sum from 
the present value of projected government spending.l24 In contrast to 
deficit accounting, which measures the government's annual cash 
flow, fiscal gap accounting measures the unfunded cost of future gov-
ernment spending. Thus, the " fiscal gap" is the amount, expressed as 
a present value, that government would have to add to its existing 
assets and its future revenues to pay in full for its projected spending if 
current fiscal policy were to remain unchanged. 125 Recent calcula-
tions put the fiscal gap at somewhere between $44 trillion and $85.5 
trillion. 126 The fiscal gap for the Social Security program alone has 
been estimated at $7 trillion. m 
The fiscal gap includes revenues and expenditures attributable to 
current , past, and future generations.128 By subtracting from govern-
ment spending attributable to current and past generations the sum of 
future government revenues attributable to those generations and the 
value of current government assets, one can determine how much of 
the unfunded cost of government is shifted from current and past gen-
erations to future generations. 129 Recent calculations put this net cost 
imposed on future generations just for Social Security at approxi-
mately $8.8 trillion. DO 
ing that the government's "current (net) dcbt held by the public plus lhe government's 
future non·interest spending must be balanced over time by its fUlUre receipts"). 
123 See Alan J. Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale & Laurence J . Kotlikoff, Using Genera-
tional Accounting to Assess Fiscal Sustainability and Generational Equity, in Dist ribu-
tional Analysis of Tax Policy 183-84 (David F. Bradford ed., 1995); Gokhale & Smellers, 
note 122, a t 7-9. 
124 Gokhale & Smellers, note 122, at 8. 
IlS Id. at 3. Alternatively, some define the fi scal gap as the prescnt value of the amount 
needed to prevent the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product from increasing 
ovcr a specified measuring period. See. e.g., Auerbach e t a I. , note 11 8, at 123; U.s. Gov't 
Accountability Office, The Nation's Long-Term Fisca l Out look 5 (2006), avai lable at hnp:1I 
www.gao.gov/new.itcmsld061077r.pdf. 
126 See Gokhale & Smellers, note 122, at 2, 25-27 (calculating the fiscal gap at $44.2 
trillion as of 2002); U.S. Gov' t Accountability Office, note 125, at 5 (calculating the fisca l 
gap, under a "realist ic simula t ion ,~ at $61 trillion as of 2006); Daniel N. Shaviro, Taxes, 
Spending, and the U.S. Government's March Toward Bankruptcy 43 (2007) (indicating 
fiscal gap as high as $85.5 trillion). 
127 Gokhale & Smellers. note 122, at 25·28 (calculated as of 2002). 
128 Id. at 8. 
129 Id. at II. 
130 Id. at 25-28 (calculatcd as of 2002). This $8.8 trillion value is higher than the overall 
fiscal gap of $7 trillion for the Social Security program because future generations are 
projectcd to pay into the program an amount that exceeds what they receive from the 
program by about $1.7 trillion. Id. at 28. 
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Generational accounting provides a second method for measuring 
how fiscal policy distributes the costs of government among different 
generations. The government adopted it briefly in the early 1990's as 
a supplement to deficit accounting,1 3] and it has been used by multilat-
eral development agencies such as the World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund.132 Generational accounting first separates 
current and past generations into birth cohorts up through children 
born in the year of the calculation.o 3 It then determines the lifetime 
net taxes paid and expected to be paid by each birth cohort on the 
assumption that current fiscal policy continues indefinitely.l34 For this 
purpose, "net taxes" comprise income taxes, payroll taxes, property 
taxes, and excise taxes paid to federal , state , and local governments 
less government transfer payments made in cash and certain cash 
equivalents (such as Social Security benefits, Medicare and Medicaid 
benefits, food stamps, and unemployment insurance).135 These life-
time net taxes are expressed, relative to lifetime income, as a net tax 
rate. Then, proceeding from the premise of the government 's inter-
temporal budget constraint, generational accounting allocates to all 
future generations the costs of government not paid for by current and 
past generations. 136 This total residual cost of government also is ex-
pressed as a lifetime net tax rate for future generations. 137 
In short, generational accounting shows both how fiscal policy has 
treated past generations relative to current generations and how the 
continuation or modification of current fiscal policy would treat future 
generations relative to the youngest members of current generations. 
Recent calculations put the lifetime net tax rate of newborns at 22.8% 
and the lifetime net tax rate of future generations at 32.3%.13& In the 
language of generational accounting, this reveals a "generational im-
III Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the Un ited Statcs Government, Fisca l 
Year 1995: A nalytical Perspectives 21-31 (1994); Office of Management and Budget, 
Budget Baselines, Historical Data, and Alternatives for the Future 531-40 app. One(F) 
(1993); Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, fis-
cal Year 1993, at 3-7 to 3-13 (1992). 
132 Auerbach & KOil ikoff, note 122, a t I. 
III Laurence J. Kot li koff, Generational Policy 53 (2003); Auerbach et al., note 67, at 59-
60. 
134 Kotlikoff, note 133, at 53. 
m Auerbach et al. , note 67, al 59; Congressional Budget O[fice, note 120, at 9. 
136 Auerbach & KotlikoU, note 122, at 33. Generational accounting generally assumes 
that the residual unfunded cost of government is allocated equally across all future genera-
tions (after allowing for an adjustment for "real productivity growth"). Auerbach et aI., 
note 67, at 61-62. 
lJ1 Auerbach & Kotlikoff, note 122, al 33. 
138 K.otlikoff, note 133, a t 67. These calculations do nOI lake into account legislation 
enacted since 2000. Id. at 67-68. 
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balance" in government fiscal policy.\39 Specific appl ication of gener-
ational accounting to Social Security demonstrates that the program 
imposes a net tax on participants born between World War II and the 
end of the 20th century. l40 For these participants, total employment 
taxes paid into the program exceed total benefit s payable from the 
program by approximately 5% of lifetime earnings. 141 This net fiscal 
burden is considerable: It represents roughly one-sixth to one-seventh 
of the lifetime net tax rate for these participants when calculated for 
all aspects of government fiscal policy.142 Similarly, generational ac-
counting indicates that many legislative reforms aimed at Social Se-
curity solvency generally would increase lifetime fiscal burdens both 
for future generations and for younger members of current 
generations. 143 
B. Limitations of Fiscal Gap a nd Generatum al Accounting 
Both fisca l gap and generational accounting constitute improve-
ments over deficit account ing in understanding the inte rgenerational 
effects of government fiscal policy. Their strength lies in their capac-
ity to project current policy forward and determine, within the param-
eters of their assumptions, which generations have borne or will bear 
many of the cash costs of gove rnment. That, in turn , tells us whether 
!he costs that will be borne by future genera tions are manageable in 
light of their anticipated incomes and , relatedly, whether the cash-flow 
implications of current fisca l policy will like ly be sustainable over the 
long term. Fiscal gap and generational accounting thus predict 
whether-and, in rough terms, when-we will have to modify fiscal 
policy to meet the cash needs of the federal government. 
The architects of fisca l gap and generational accounting argue that 
these measures therefore should replace deficit accounting as the pre-
ferred standard for assessing fiscal policy.144 More pointedly, they ar-
gue that government fisca l policy should ignore the federal budget 
deficit and instead should aim to achieve both "fisca l balance"-the 
139 Id. at 58-59; Jagadeesh Gokhale, Benjamin R. Page & John R_ Sturrock, Genera-
tional Accounts for the Un ited Stales: An Update, in Generational Accounling Around 
the World, nOle 122, at 491, 498. 
J411 Caldwell e l aI. , note 44, a l 130-34. 
J4J Id. at 130. 
142 Auerbach el aI. , nOle 123, at 200 (showing lifelime nel lax rales for post-War 
generalions). 
143 Caldwell el al., nOlc 44, al 134-39; Alan J. Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale & Laurence 
J. KOilikoff, Social Security and Medicare Policy from Ihe Perspective of Generational Ac-
counling 9 (NBER Working Paper No. 3915, 1991), available at htlp:llwww.nbcr.orglpa-
perslw39I S.pdr?new _window: 1. 
144 Gokhale & Smellers, note 122, a l 1-2; Kotlikoff, nOie 53, at 217-18. 
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elimination of any fi scal gap-and "generational balance"-the elimi-
nation of any shift in the cost of government from current generations 
to future generations,, 45 Th is proposed redefinition of the end of fis-
cal policy can be set forth in a weak version or a strong version. The 
weak version is predicti ve. It argues that , given the stubborn fact of 
the gove rnment 's intertemporal budget constraint , the existence of a 
fisca l or generational imbalance demonstrates that current fiscal pol-
icy is unsustainable and that government cannot avoid changing its 
fi scal poli cy in some manner at some poin t. 146 The weak version 
predicts that government policy will change, but it does not predict 
when or how it will change. The strong version, by contrast, is norma-
tive. It argues not only that government fiscal policy will change but 
that it should change because of the otherwise inequitable outcomes 
for future generations. 147 Quite apart from the notion that changing 
those outcomes is inevitable, the strong version argues that changing 
those outcomes is right. 
The strong version of the claim, however, is misplaced. Although 
they provide interesting analytic information, fisca l gap and genera-
tional accounting do not move us close r to answering the question 
whether current fiscal policy or any specific reform to current fiscal 
policy is fair to current and future generations. First, neither fiscal gap 
nor generational accounting addresses the normative problems, dis-
cussed in Pa rt II, that any account of intergene rational equity must 
address. For example, both restrict their analysis to the frame of gov-
ernment fisca l policy and the reby ignore all other intergenerational 
transfe rs made through othe r aspects of government policy and 
through nongovernment activities. 
Second, both fiscal gap and generational accoun ting treat the bene-
fits and burdens of government fiscal policy asymmetrically. Propo-
nents and critics have noted that these measures do not account fo r all 
the benefits of government spending, including government spending 
to purchase goods and services and government spending that results 
in public goods. us In o the r words, many of the benefits prod uced by 
14~ Gokhale & Smellers, note 122, at 2; Kotlikoff, note 53, at 218·19. 
146 Gokhale & Smetters, nOle 122, at 2; Kot likoff, note 133, at 67·69; Gokhale el al., note 
139, at 490. 
147 Kotl ikoff, note 53, a t 219·20; Alan J. Auerbach , Jagadeesh Gokhale & Laurence J. 
Kotlikoff, Genera tional Accounting: A Meaningfu l Way to Evaluate Fiscal Policy, 8 J. 
Econ. Persp. 73, 82. 84·85 (Win ter, 1994). But see Laurence 1. KOI likoff, Reply to Dia-
mond's and CUller's Reviews of Generational Accouming, 50 Nat'l Tax J. 303, 308 (1 997) 
("[NJeither J nor my colleagues have suggested that generational ba lance is a sine qua non 
for generational equi ty. "). 
148 Neil H, Buchanan, Social Securil Y, Generational1ustiee, and Long-Term Deficils, 58 
Tax L. Rev. 275,311·12 (2005); Willem H. Buiter, Gellerational Accounts, Aggregate Sav· 
ing and Intergenerational Distribut ion, 64 Economica 605, 606 (1997); Gokhale & Smet-
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fiscal policy are not attributed by fiscal gap or generational accounting 
to any generation-past, present, or future. Thus, the benefits of po-
litical libert ies and civil rights, national defense against fore ign ene-
mies, a functioning system of justice, maintaining constitutional order, 
and many similar goods provided by government are simply disre-
garded in comparing the intergenerat ional distribution of fiscal policy 
benefi ts and burdens.149 This treatment is inconsistent with the treat-
ment of the cost of government spending to produce those benefits: 
Both fiscal gap and generational accounting attribute the burden of 
providing these benefits to those paying the taxes that finance them, 
but the benefits are attributed to no one. 
Fiscal gap and generational accounting do not account for these 
benefits because they cannot account for them.lso Any att empt to de-
termine the value of these benefits would be arbitrary. One might 
consider using the cost to government of providing the benefits as a 
first approximation for value, but that method would produce striking 
anomalies. As Peter Diamond argues, it is important to distinguiSh 
distributional calculations based on costs and distributional ca lcula-
tions based on utilitjes. 151 There is little reason to suppose, for exam-
ple, that individuals value freedom from foreign invasion exactly at 
the amount spent by government on national defense.152 Assuming 
that the value of such benefits could be determined, actual attribution 
of that value to specific generations would be arbitrary. David Cutler 
points out that we have no idea how much one particular generation 
ters, note 122, ~t 13; Robert Haveman, Should Generational Accounts Replace Public 
Budgets and Oericits? 8 J. Econ. Persp. 95, 97. 100-01 (Winter. 1994); Shaviro, note 56, at 
131; KotlikoU. note 53, at 168. But see Gokhale et al. , nOte 139, at 498-501 (attempting 
generational att ribution of some, but nOt all , government purchases). Shaviro, note 126. at 
38-39 (a rguing that "generational accounting treats taxes and transfers symmetrically"). 
149 See, e.g., Auerbach et al .. note 67, al 87-92. 
ISO Cutler, note 119. at 66: Gokhale & Smelters. note 122, al 13; Kotlikoff, note 133, at 
55; see also Auerbach & KotJikoff. note 122, at 32 ("With the exception of government 
expenditures on health care and education, which are treated as transfer payments, (gener-
ational] accounts do nol impute to particular generations the value of the government's 
purchases of goods and services because it is difficult to attribute the benefitS of such 
purchases:'); Congressional Budget Office, note 120, at 45 ("Trying to assign the benefitS 
of mOSI (government] purchases to specific generations ... is impracticable."). Buiter 
notes that "(c]onccptua lly. there is no special problem in valuing public consumption " but 
that "Iiln practice, of course, the quantification of welfare consequences of public con· 
sumption is likely to be an extremely complicated job." Buiter, note 148, at 616. 
131 Peter Diamond, Generational Accounts and Gcnerational Balance: An Assessment, 
49 Nat 'l Tax J. 597, 599 (1996) (explaining that the "difference between the cost and ut ility 
approaches~ depends on "how people valued the expenditures" so that " the sum of utili-
ties from the expenditures might be larger or smaller than the aggregate level of 
expenditures"). 
IS2 Id. at 605 (giving an example regarding the interstate highway system; however, the 
point is applicable across a broad range of government purchases). 
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benefits from national defense relative to any other particular genera-
tion, even if one faces greater threats to its security than the other. 153 
The asymmetry presents a much more significant limitation on fiscal 
gap and generational accounting as reference points for intergenera-
tional equity than either proponents or critics have recognized. The 
failure to account for these benefits not only affects the analysis of the 
government spending that is obviously devoted to the provision of 
public goods, such as national defense;IS4 it also undermines the analy-
sis of government transfer programs~programs supposedly at the 
core of fiscal gap and generational accounting. Government transfer 
payments for Social Security, Medicare, and food stamps provide 
more than just cash and cash equivalents to the recipients and their 
family members. They also provide public goods more broadly. Past, 
current , and future generations derive a substantial benefit of the pub-
lic-good variety from living in a society that limits poverty among the 
elderly through the Social Security and Medicare programs. Similarly, 
members of past, current, and future generations who never have seen 
and never will see a food stamp or a welfare payment realize a benefit 
from government programs intended to prevent children from starv-
ing in the streets. 
These and similar noncash benefits attributable to government fis-
cal policy are genuine and substantial. They provide individuals who 
receive no government transfer payments with returns on the taxes 
that they pay to the government. Such benefits also legitimize politi-
cal decisions made by individuals as to how great a tax burden they 
are willing to accept. But fiscal gap and generational accounting treat 
all these public-good benefits, which simply cannot be collapsed into 
the cash transfer payments that facilitate them, as though they were 
provided entirely to the individuals who receive the transfer payments 
or to no one at all. In other words, even though the project of fiscal 
gap and generational accounting is to determine how the benefits and 
burdens of government fiscal policy are distributed across different 
generations, fiscal gap and generational accounting do not account 
properly for many of the most important benefits that justify those 
burdens. 
Failing to account fully for the benefits of government fiscal policy 
and to attribute those benefits to the appropriate generations critically 
undermines our ability to judge whether government fiscal policy, as 
measured by fiscal gap and generational accounting, is fair to different 
m Cutler, note t19, at 66. 
I~ See, e.g., Staff Paper Prepared for the Presidenl's Commission to Study Capital 
Budgeting, Generational Accounting (Apr. 21 , 1998), available at htlp:lfc1inton3.nara.govl 
pcscb/staCgenacc.html; Diamond, note lSI , at 605. 
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generations. Any meaningful norm of intergenerational equity, at a 
minimum, must account for both burdens and benefits. Consider the 
absurd results implied by the contrary position, that is, the possibility 
that we undertake normati ve judgments about inte rgenerational eq-
uity by considering only burdens but not benefits. Assume, for this 
limited purpose, that there was a broad agreement that trea ting differ-
ent generations equitably required treating each separate generation 
the same .- 55 Now posit a new program under which the government 
imposes a tax on members of Generation A (many of whom are par-
ents of young children) in order to provide uni versal pre-school care 
to all members of Generation B (all of whom are young children) . A 
normati ve evaluation of this program that considered only the imposi-
tion of burdens would find the policy unfair to Generation A. But the 
emptiness of that conclusion becomes readily apparent when we ac-
knowledge that the beneficiaries of the policy are the members of 
Generation A who are themselves parents of young children. The pro-
gram may present questions of equity within a single generation be-
cause it redistributes wealth from members of Generation A who are 
not parents of young children to members of Generation A who a re 
parents of young children. But to label the program unfair or inequi-
table across generations is to miss the mark by quite a wide margin. 
Indeed, pushed toward its limits, the proposition that the in -
tergenerational equity of fisca l po licy can be evaluated without ac-
counting fully for the benefits of that policy would lead to conclusions 
that we generall y would reject outright. Consider, fo r example, the 
case of a government that imposes large fisca l burdens on future gen-
erations by borrowing heavil y to fin ance national defense against an 
impending fo reign invasion.l56 If the intergenerational equity of gov-
ernment fiscal policy were appropriately evaluated, as a normative 
matter, by considering only the burdens imposed on different genera-
tions, one might think the government's decision to borrow exces-
sively during time of war to be intergenerationally inequitable . But 
that conclusion rightl y strikes one as absurd and dangerously wrong. 
Few could agree that a government policy of devoting all available 
resources of present and future generations to preserve the nation's 
security against an invading enemy is unfair to the future generations 
who otherwise would be born into a state of occupation. Yet that is 
precisely the implication of making normative judgments about how 
the costs of fin ancing national defense are distributed among current 
15$ This assumption is made solely for convenience of presenla tion. 
156 See, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, note 120, at 25, 45. Consider, for example, 
the debts incurred by Great Britain during World War II. See, e.g., Sean Glynn & Alan 
Booth, Modern Bri tain: An Economic and Social History 154-55 (1996). 
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and future generations, without also accounting for how the benefits 
of that spending are distributed. 
This shortcoming prevents fiscal gap and generational accounting 
from serving as a basis for normative judgments about the past or fu-
ture intergenerational effects both of government fiscal policy gener-
ally and of specific tax-aDd-transfer programs. As shown in Part II, 
the Social Security program has redistributed approximately $13 tril-
lion in cash from program participants born after 1937 to program 
participants born before 1938. 157 But any effort to make normative 
assessments about the intergenerational equity of the program breaks 
down once we recognize that these numbers fail to account fully for 
the program's benefits. We can label the participants born after 1937 
as net losers under the program based on the $13 Irillion transfer, but 
we cannol know whether we should still regard them as net losers if 
the noncash benefits that they receive from Social Security were taken 
into account. Most of those born after 1937 derive a genuine benefit 
from the existence of a government program thai provides cash sup-
port to the elderly and disabled, and many would be willing to pay 
taxes into the program even if they understood that they will receive 
less than they contribute. Certainly the analyses of fiscal gap and 
generational accounting reveal useful and interesting information 
about Social Security, but they do not provide us enough information 
about its intergenerational effects to make normative judgments. I SS 
C. Additional Problems with Fiscal Gap and 
Generational Accounting 
Fiscal gap and generational accounting also present other difficul-
ties. Both rely on projections not only of future government behavior 
but also of future economic conditions, and those projections will 
likely prove incorrect. Both treat all future generations as an undif-
ferentiated group-so that those born next year are not distinguished 
from those born many years in the future. Both make assumptions 
about how tbe benefits and burdens of government policy should be 
attributed to current and future generations. IS9 
1 ~7 See note 38. 
1511 These objections are also generally relevant to aUempts to measure the intragenera-
tional equity of government fiscal policy. See Murphy & Nagel, note 85, at 3-39; see also 
Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 
126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47, 81 ·82 n.l06 (1971) ("ll)t is impossible to evaluate income tax 
changes in tenns of vertical equity without looking at the overall effects of governmental 
action on the distribution of income."). 
159 Except for the nondifferentiation pOint, these problems are generally familiar from 
evaluating the innageneralional effects of government fiscal policy. See generally, Graetz, 
note 61. 
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1. Uncertainty of Assumptions 
As critics of fiscal gap and generational accounting have noted, any 
effort 10 quantify the intergene rat ional effects of current or reformed 
fiscal policy necessarily requires assumpt ions about future condi-
tions- including economic growth, interest rates, risk premia, popula-
tion growth, mortality rates, incomes, and the costs of specific goods 
and se rvices relat ive to those of other specific goods and services. l60 
For example, ca lculating the fiscal gap attributable to Social Security 
depends critica lly on assumptions about a wide array of economic 
data, and va riations in those data can alter the analysis significan tly. 
Assumptions, of course, can prove right or wrong. 
The possibility of error in the assumptions needed to calculate the 
fiscal gap and generational accounts is much more significant than it is 
for deficit accounting because of the longer time frame. Deficit ac-
counting typically looks forward over a five- or ten-yea r period, while 
fiscal gap and generational accounting typically look forward over a 
seventy-five-yea r period or even the infinite future. The longer hori-
zon makes assumptions about future economic conditions inherently 
more speculative. For example, determining the size of the unfunded 
liability for Medicare benefits over a seventy-five-year period requires 
assumptions about the cost of health care over the next 75 years. The 
longer horizon also magnifies the effect of erroneous assumptions: 
The present va lue of an obliga tion to pay a $10,000 Social Security 
benefit seventy-five years from now is just under $1100 if discounted 
at an interest rate of 3%, but the present value of that same obligation 
is just over $525 if discounted at 4%. 
Still , the problem of uncertain assumptions does not undermine the 
central project of fiscal gap and generational accounting. Any attempt 
to quantify the future effects of government fisca l policy necessarily 
makes assumptions about future states of the world; the question is 
not whether the assumptions ultimately prove correct but whether 
they incorporate the best ava ilable information and follow appropri-
ate methodologies. ]6 1 Although the uncertainty of the assumptions 
suggests a corresponding uncertainty of the results, it does not imply 
that Ihe results are meaningless. 
160 Dean Baker. Robbing Ihe Cradle? A Critical Assessment of Generational Account-
ing 16-19 (1995); Buchanan. no]e 148. at3 13·14; Congressional Budget Office, note 120, al 
29-32; Diamond, note lSI , at 602-03; Goode & Steuerle, no]e 56, a] 1030-31; Haveman, 
note 148, at 101-04. 
161 Scnsitivi]y analyses generally indicate that varying the relevant assumptions wi thin 
reasonable parame]ers alters ]he magnitude, but not the existence, or fiscal gap and gener-
a]ional imbalances. Gokhale & Smellers, nOle 122, al 35-4t ; Kotlikof(, note 133, at 67. 
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2. Nondifferentiation of Future Gellerations 
Both fiscal gap and generational accounting begin with the govern-
ment 's intertemporal budget constraint and calculate as a residuum 
the unpaid cost of government that will be borne by all future genera-
tions. Thus, both measures determine a net cost imposed on future 
generations as a whole rather than on particular future generations 
separately. Fiscal gap accounting simply measures the total unfunded 
cost of government as a single oet burden for the future. Although 
generational accounting does measure lifetime tax rates for members 
of current and past generations, it does not make a similar measure-
ment , for example, with respect to the cohort born ten yea rs from now 
or 100 years from now.162 Therefore , as both critics and defenders of 
fiscal gap and generational accounting have noted, these measures tell 
us how government fisca l policy has treated separate generations up 
through the one born today, but they do not tell us how government 
fiscal policy will treat any specific future generation relative to any 
other specific future generation or relative to any specific current or 
past generation. ]63 
3. /rtcidence of Fiscal Benefits and Burdens 
Even where fiscal gap and generational accounting do make distinc~ 
tions among generations, there are reasons to question how they attri~ 
bute the benefits and burdens of fiscal policy. Perhaps of necessity, 
these measures make simplifying assumptions about the incidence of 
taxation. For example, individual income taxes genera lly are consid-
ered to be borne by the individual paying the tax, and taxes on capital 
income generally are attributed to the owners of capital. ]64 
No less importantly, both fiscal gap and generational accounting 
flatly assume that there is no "sliding" of government benefits among 
family members. 16 S When government makes a transfer payment to 
an individual , fiscal gap and generational accounting treat the nominal 
162 Gokhalc ct aL, note 139, a] 493-98. 
163 Diamond, note lSI , at 603-04; Gokhale & Smellers. note 122, at 11; Haveman. note 
148, al 97, 100; Kotlikoff, no]e 133, al 55-56. 
164 Auerbach & Kotl ikoff, note 122, a t 34; Congressional Budget Office. note 7, a] 37-38; 
Haveman, note 148, al 98-99, 104-06; Kotl ikoff. note 133, a t 60. The proponents of genera-
tional accounting concede thai, although it "attempts to understand the generationa l inci-
dence .. of fiscal policy changcs," the measure "incorporates a set of incidence 
assump]ions thaI will nOI, in general, capture the fu ll range of either microeconomic or 
macroeconomic responses to policy changes" and "should be viewed as a mcthod of ap-
proximating the policy-induced welfare changes experienced by di fferent generations." 
Generational Accounting Around the World, note 122, a l 4. 
16!i Gokhale & Smelters, nOle 122, a t 11 , 53-54; KO\likoff, notc 133, al 61 : Congressional 
Budget Office, note 120. at 37-38; Haveman, note 148, a t 104-06; Office of Managemenl 
and Budget, note 131 . at 23. 
2008) INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY IN FISCAL POLICY REFORM 283 
recipient of the payment as the only beneficiary. This effectively as-
sumes, for example, that the adult children of Social Security recipi-
ents derive no economic benefit from the fact that their elderly 
parents receive income support from the government and that parents 
of young children derive no economic benefit from Ihe fact Ihat their 
children receive publicly financed education. 
To appreciate the problems this causes, assume that the government 
introduced a program to pay full post-secondary education costs for 
anyone under the age of twenty-five. In the absence of this program, 
many parents of individuals under the age of twenty-five pay for all or 
part of those costs; this implies that , at least initially, parents would 
capture part or all of the benefits of the program. But fiscal gap and 
generational accounting would consider individuals under the age of 
twenty-five to be the sole recipients of the program benefits- result-
ing in a miscalculation of the generational effects of the program. As-
sume further that, over time, some families respond to the ex.istence of 
the program by increasing their support of older family members. 
Thus, because Mother no longer pays the college costs of Son, she 
increases the amounts she pays to support Grandmother. At this 
point, part of the cost of repealing the program would be borne by 
Mother and part by Grandmother, but fiscal gap and generational ac-
counting would show the full burden of repeal as falling on Son. l 66 
The assumption that the benefits of the program do not slide between 
family members can result in misattribution. 
The architects of fiscal gap and generational accounting defend the 
assumption that benefits do not slide by attacking the position-gen-
erally referred to as "Ricardian equivalence"-that individual saving 
and dissaving respond directly to changes in government fiscal policy 
and, in fact , offset the effects of government fiscal policy.167 Even if 
full Ricardian equivalence is implausible, it does not follow that there 
is no sliding at all.]68 Plainly, many adults would take their elderly 
166 Of course, if Mother responded to the progrilm simply by increasing her bequest to 
Son by iln ilmOunt equal to what she otherwise would hilvc pilid for his post-secondary 
educa tion, Son would capture the full benefit of the program and would bear the full cost 
of its repeal. 
161 See Robert 1. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, 82 J. Pol. Econ. 1095, 
1116 (NovemberlDeeember. 1974); sec also Leimer I, note 32, at 43-44: Shaviro, Reckless 
Disregard, nOIe 74, at 1288. 
168 Sce Robert 1. Lampman & Timothy M. Smeeding, Interfamily Transfers as Alterna-
tives to Government Transfers to Persons, 29 Rev. of Income & Wcalth 45, 47-54 (1983), 
available at http://www.roiw.org/1983/45.pdf;see also Jane G. Gravelle, Methodological ls-
sues of Generational Accounting, in Distributional Analysis of Tax Policy 208 (David F. 
Bradford ed., 1995) ("Truth presumably lies somewhere between no transfers and Ricar-
dian equivalence."). But see Li Gan, Guan Gong & Michael Hurd, Net Intergenerational 
Transfers from an Increase in Social Security Benefits (The Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard C. 
Working Paper No. 482, 2006), available at hnp:!lwww.levy.orglpubslwp_482.pdf. 
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parents into their homes or otherwise provide for them in the absence 
of government-provided support such as Social Security and Medi-
care , and , plainly, many parents of young children would finance their 
children's education in the absence of publicly financed education,I69 
To attribute every dollar of every government transfer payment only 
to the nominal recipient of that payment is to ignore the important 
relationships existing among family members of different generations 
that imply commitments of support. Fiscal gap and generational ac-
counting improperly assume a false dichotomy: Either there must be 
full Ricardian equivalence, or there is no intergenerational sliding at 
all. To the extent that fiscal policy benefits slide in part, the actual 
incide nce of those benefits is more nuanced and obscure than fiscal 
gap and generational accounting assume. 
IV. POLITIC AL ApPROAClll';S TO I N'I'ERGENERATIONA L EQUITY 
The skeptical case developed thus far offers little to policymakers 
whose responsibilities include decisions that have intergenera tional ef-
fects. Consider the question of Social Security reform. A conscien-
tious lawmaker may regard the long-term insolvency of the program 
to be a pressing policy matter; she may understand that the program 
has redistributed substantial wea lth from current and future genera-
tions to past generations; and she may express concern that any re-
form aimed at restoring long-term solvency not place inequitable 
burdens on future generations. But the discussion in Parts II and III 
above provides no real guidance 10 this conscientious lawmaker. To 
advise her that there is no sound method for measuring all the rele-
vant intergenerational effects of the program or any program reform 
and that, even if there were a way of measuring those effects, there is 
no meaningful normative framework for evaluating them is to imply 
that she might as well ignore concerns about intergenerational equity 
entirely. Before concluding that questions of intergenerational equity 
cannot be add ressed within fiscal policy reform, however, it is neces-
sary to consider whether those questions might be resolved satisfacto-
169 Steuerle and 8akija argue that Social Security benefits "may .. be viewed as replac-
ing transfers that workers would have made otherwise to their retired parents" and that, 
correspondingly, " ltJhe smaller li fetime private transfers these workers receive from their 
children might be viewed as an offset to large public transfers given to them." Steuerle & 
Bakija, note 7, at 131 n.32; see also Congressional Budget Office, note 120, at 39 (discuss-
ing uncertainties regarding "how or how much transfers slide"); Achenbaum, note 4, at S3 
(describing benefits conferred on children of earliest program part icipants through relief 
from family support obligations). As Haveman puts it: "On what basis can one presume 
that health care benefits-or retirement pensions-assigned to the e lderly represent net 
benefits to them, as opposed to their adul t children on whom the burden could have fallen 
were not the public program in place?" Haveman, note 148, at 105. 
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rily through political processes. There is reason for guarded optimism 
here, including the fact that politics serves as the vehicle for resolving 
other difficult normative questions presented by government pOlicy. 
A. Politics as a Proxy for Substantive Eqllity 
Arguably, we can pursue intergenerational equity in fiscal policy re-
form even if we cannot adequately measure intergenerational effects 
and even if we lack a normative framework for evaluating those ef-
fects. Consider, for comparative purposes, how we address questions 
of intragenerational equity in fiscal policy. Public fin ance theory does 
not provide perfect measures of how government fiscal policy trans-
fers resources among different groups of current generations;l70 and, 
certainly, there are sharply different views about what constitutes a 
just, equi table, or fair distribution of wea lth among those groups. Few 
would argue, however, that government cannot or should not pursue 
intragenerational equity through its fiscal policy. Our political dis-
course generally recognizes as relevant and meaningful the claims 
made about the desirability or undesirability of government redistri-
bution through tax and transfer programs; we consider it reasonable 
and well within the bounds of normal political debate to argue that 
fairness and equi ty demand more or less redistribution than current 
government policy effects. 
Importantly, our notions of intragenerational equity do not have a 
formal role in government policymaking. Although we may praise or 
criticize particular government policies from the standpoint of in-
tragenerational equity, no specific measure of intragenerational distri-
butional effects is considered controlling, and no specific normative 
framework of intragenerational equity has anything approaching offi-
cial status. In other words, the intragenerational equity or inequity of 
a particular policy decision does not provide a basis for the legal vali-
dation or invalidation of the policy decision. One individual may be-
lieve strongly that the intragenerational distribut ive effects of a 
particular policy are fundamenta lly unjust , and another individual 
may strongly believe otherwise. They have a basis for reasoned disa-
greement, but neither can invoke any forma l mechanism of the legisla-
tive or judicial process to overturn or confirm the policy decision on 
the ground that it reaches an intragenerationally inequitable or equi-
table result. 
The reason, of course, is that we do not accord actual legal signifi-
cance to any substantive conception of intragenerationai equity. In-
stead, we treat politics as a proxy for intragenerational equi ty, and we 
110 For a general discussion, see DisuibUlional Analysis of Tax Policy, nOle t68. 
286 TAX LAW REVIEW [Yol. 61: 
insist on fairness of political processes rather than fairness of substan-
tive outcomes. As long as everyone with a slake in the outcome has 
an opportunity to engage in the processes of governme nt-as Daryl 
Levinson puts it , "[a]5 long as a group can compete on roughl y fair 
terms in the pluralist political marketpl ace"171- we treat the policy 
decisions made through those processes as va lid and binding, whether 
o r not everyone would agree that the outcomes are equitable as a sub-
stantive matter. 
But that points up an obvious and important limitation to the com-
parison of intergenerational equity and intragenerational equity. Fu-
ture generations cannot participate in the political processes through 
which policy decisions are made in the present that likely will affect 
their interests. 112 On the question of Social Security reform, for ex-
ample, po licy options that would restore long-term program solvency 
would involve the distribution of a cash burden equal to several tril-
tion dollars over current generations, future generations, or both . 
Curre nt generations could undertake program reform immediately 
and , at one extreme, could bear the e ntire cash burde n of solvency 
themselves o r, at the other extreme, transfer the entire cash burden of 
solvency to futu re generations. In either case, the policy decision af-
fects the inte rests of future generations, but those future generations 
are unable to participate in the political processes through which the 
decision is made. This mirrors the earl y history of the Social Security 
program, when the participants born before the Second World War 
voted generous windfall benefits fo r themselves that would be paid for 
by participants who were e ither not yet born o r simply too young to 
participa te in the political process at the relevant moments. 
The model that se rves intragenerational considerations well- treat-
ing the outcome of normal politica l processes as a proxy fo r substan-
tive fa irness-breaks down, then, whe n inte rgenerational 
considerations are at stake. Future generations cannot "compete on 
roughly fair terms" in the give-and-take of political decision making; 
indeed, they cannot compete at all. Because of this nonre presentation 
problem, there might appear to be no reason to treat the results of 
political processes as good proxies for substantive fa irness. If politics 
is to provide a meaningful substitute fo r a robust understanding of 
111 Levinson. note 2, a t 1351. 
m This point often is made in the context of political decision making on matters having 
intergenera tional effects. See, e.g., Cowen, note 68, at 6; Eric A. Posner, Agencies Should 
Ignore Distant·Fut ure Generations, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 139, 141 (2007) ("Congress and the 
president will support policies that benefit nonvoting fu ture generatiOns only to the extent 
that they are supported by voting members of the current generatioD."); Congressional 
Budget Office, note 120, at I. 
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intergenerational equity, perhaps more than ordinary political 
processes will be needed. 
B. Potential Approaches to the Nonrepreseutation Problem 
The fact that the interests of future generations are affected by deci-
sions in fiscal policy and other aspects of gove rnment policy is una-
voidable; the fact that future generations cannot participate directly in 
those decisions is unalterable. Familiar mechanisms for addressing 
representational problems- such as redrawing the boundaries of leg-
islative districts173-obviously provide no solution. Arguably, how-
ever, refinements of the political processes through which government 
policy is made could mitigate the nonrepresentation problem by im-
proving the capacity of current generat ions to take the interests of 
future generations into account. 
James Fishkin has proposed the idea of a deliberative opinion poll 
as a means for improving the quality of political decisionmakingY4 
Fishkin contrasts the deliberative opinion poll with the familiar opin-
ion poll: "An ordinary poll models what the electorate thinks, given 
how little it knows. A deliberative opinion poll models what the elec-
torate would think if, hypothetically, it could be immersed in intensive 
deliberative processes. "175 The underlying notion is that political 
decision making following deliberative debate among citizens provides 
superior outcomes-superior in the sense of better reflecting the pub-
lic interest as a whole-than ord inary, fragmented, majoritarian politi-
cal decisionmaking. The deliberative opinion poll is a prescriptive 
method for determining what the body politic as a whole would decide 
on an issue if it were feasible for the body politic to engage in the kind 
of thoughtful deliberative processes that are practicable only in small 
settings. 176 
Fishkin has thought seriously and deeply about the problem of in-
tergenerational equity, but he does not offer the idea of the delibera-
tive opinion poll in that context. Still , if his central claim about 
deliberative democracy is correct-if deliberative debate does im-
prove the quality of political decisionmaking-it would seem reasona-
ble to extend the idea specifically to policy questions that pose hard 
issues about the treatment of future generations. At a minimum, the 
I7l Sec Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1%2) (holding that plaintiffS presented a justiciable 
constitutional cause of action in claiming that the legislative apportionment method vio-
lated their equal protection rights). 
174 See generally Debating Deliberative Democracy (James S. Fishkin & PeteT LasJeu 
eds., 2(03); James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Demo-
cratic Reform (1991). 
m Fishk in, note 174, at 81 (emphasis in original). 
176 Id. 
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deliberative opinion poll and other processes aimed at improving de-
liberative democracy should make current generations better able to 
understand and assess the interests of future generations. 
Similarly, Raymond Kopp and Paul Portney propose "mock refer-
enda" to improve pOlicymaking on issues having intergenerational ef-
fects. 177 Their notion is to provide a select group of voters with 
complete information about the likely near-term and long-term effects 
of various policy options in order to elicit information about those 
voters' preferences. 178 Although the mock referenda mechanism is 
proposed as a means of understanding the weight that current genera-
tions attach to different intergenerational effects, arguably it could be 
adapted to gather information about the weight that current genera-
tions believe future generations would attach to different intergenera-
tional effects. Again, this should improve the decisionmaking by 
current generations on policy questions that unavoidably affect the in-
terests of future generations. 
These refinements to the political process have definite limitations, 
however. First, both the deliberative opinion poll and the mock refer-
endum have latent anti-democratic features related to the questions of 
agenda control and voting procedures. Consider the deliberative 
opinion poll. In order for this mechanism to succeed, someone must 
decide what questions will be debated by the deliberative group, what 
the rules for debate will be, and, once the debate has concluded, how 
the deliberative opinion poll will be conducted. Similarly, the mock 
referendum requires an agenda setter and a rule setter to avoid proce-
dural chaos. In ordinary politics, these organizational questions are 
addressed directly through ordinary political processes, with all the 
opportunities for political participation that attend other political de-
cisions. Because the deliberative opinion pon and the mock referen-
dum specifically seek to transcend ordinary politics, it hardly seems 
clear that ordinary political processes will be able to set the rules of 
the game while ensuring the intended effects. Whoever controls the 
design of a deliberative opinion poll or a mock referendum involving 
intergenerational issues will have a substantial influence on whether 
and how the interests of future generations are weighted. 
Additionally, neither the deliberative opinion poll nor the mock ref-
erendum can provide future generations with genuine representation 
in political processes. At best, these mechanisms can improve the 
quality of information that current generations have about the inter-
In Raymond J. Kopp & Paul R. Portney, Mock Referenda for Intergenerational Deci-
sionmaking, in Discounting and Intergenerational Equity 87 (Paul R. Portney & John P. 
Weyant eds., 1999). 
178 Id. a1 91~96. 
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ests of future generations. Neither mechanism, however, can fo rce 
current generations to attach any particular we ight to those interests; 
and neither mechanism can remove conflicts between the interests of 
current generations and future generations.179 For example, a deliber-
ative opinion poll or a mock re ferendum conducted in 1939 might 
have made voters at that time aware that changing Social Securi ty 
from a pre funded to an unfunded program would shift wea lth from 
(then) future participants to (then) current participants; but even full 
information on that point may not have changed the outcome at all: 
Voters in 1939 might have given their own interests far greater weight 
than the inte rests of fu ture pa rticipants, even with the improved infor-
mation about the long-term effects of the policy change_ 
Alternatively, the interests of future generations could be fac tored 
into the political process as a counter-majoritarian check on certain 
policy outcomes. Thus, decisions made by current gene rations that 
inappropriately burden future generations could be rendered inva lid, 
in much the same way that policy decisions inappropriately burdening 
protected groups are struck down.tSO Legislative precomrnitments on 
fiscal policy matters- such as mandates for balanced budgets and 
nondiscretionary reductions in fede ral expenditures to enforce those 
mandates-arguably fa ll within this category. As recent expe rience 
with such mandates has established, of course, there is always a ques-
tion of how tightly such precommitments actually bind policy out-
comes once legislators have set their minds to working around them. 
Ignoring the enforceability problem, one could formulate a version 
of such a mandate that expressly takes the interests of futu re genera-
tions into account. For example, the lawmaking process could require 
that fiscal policy legislation having intergenerational effects not im-
pose a burden on any futu re generation greater than the largest bur-
den imposed on any current generation. To bring the 
nonrepresentation problem to the forefront , sllch a requirement could 
consider a "future generation" to be any generation that, by reason of 
its age or by reason of not yet having been born, is not eligible to 
participate in the processes of representative government and a "cur-
rent gene ration" to be any generation that, by reason of its age, is 
179 See a lso Sunstein & Rowell , nOle 90, at 178 (noting that the pOSSibility of self-inter-
ested preferences undermines attempts to determine the interests of fu ture generations "by 
conSUl ting the preferences of the present generation"). 
ISO This suggests a weak analogy 10 the constitut ional guarantee of equal protection 
when understood as "reserv[ing) specia l judicia l solicitude [or those few groups . . . that are 
systematically disadvantaged by some failu re in the polit ical market and likely to get less 
than their ' fair share ' of favorable outcomes. " Levinson, note 2, al 1351. For a fu ller de· 
velopment of that analogy in the context of intergenerational equity, see R. George 
Wright, The Interests of Posteri ty in the Constitut ional Scheme, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 113 
(1990). 
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eligible to participate in the processes of representative government. 
Under such a requirement , if anyone current generation wanted to 
impose burdens on future generations, it must be willing to impose a 
burden of at least the same size on itself. 
There are serious limitations to this approach as we ll. First, it rein-
troduces all the normative and analytic problems discussed in Parts II 
and III . Any procedural mechanism inte nded as a binding precom-
mitment to intergenerational equity will necessarily require the arbi -
trary selection of a frame for analysis (for example, all fiscal policy 
legislation). A nd comparing the net burdens that a particular item of 
legislation would impose on a future generation to the ne t burdens it 
would impose on current generations for the purpose of defining what 
is a legislatively valid outcome assumes that one can have a high de-
gree of confidence in the measurements themselves; as discussed 
above, that confidence is misplaced in the case of quantifying in-
te rgenerational effects. More fundamentally, however, this is a con-
ceptually flawed approach to the nonrepresentation problem because 
it does not really attempt to introduce the interests of future genera-
tions to the political process; rather, it treats those interests as uncon-
ditional trumps. In other words, it overplays the analogy between 
protected groups within current generations (such as specific racial or 
ethnic groups) and future generations; although trumps are appropri-
ate in the intragenerational context of equal protection, it by no 
means follows that concern for the interests of future generations 
sbould suppress the right of current generations to self-de termination 
through the legislati ve process. 
In sum, conceivable changes to the pOlitical process would not satis-
factorily address the inevitable nonrepresentation problem presented 
whenever present policy decisions affect the interests of future gener-
ations. Although current generations can be made to understand bet-
ter the likely effects of their choices on future generations, current 
generations cannot be made to assign any particular weight to those 
interests. Attempting to place formal binds on legislative outcomes 
reintroduces the very undesirable arbitrariness of framing and mea-
suring; in any event, such binds almost surely give too much weight to 
the interests of future generations by treating those inte rests as out-
right trumps on the policy decisions of current generations. lSI 
lSI See Shaviro, note 56, at 177-78 (rejecting notion that political process can adequately 
take account of future generations' interests). 
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C. The Interests of Overlapping Generations 
All the same, the seriousness of the nonrepresentation problem 
should not be overstated. Current generations generally do take into 
account the interests of future generations to the extent that parents 
and grandparents, when participating in the political process, assess 
the effects of their policy decisions on their children and grandchil-
dren who are not yet able to vote or otherwise participate in represen-
tational government. We generally take it for granted, for example, 
that parents will vote in the interests of their children on matters such 
as education policy, health policy, and compulsory military service. 
The fact that one generation passes along a fiscal burden to the next 
generation-such as happened in the formative years of the Social Se-
curity program-does not necessarily indicate that the earli er genera-
tion ignored the interests of the later generation. Rather, it may 
indicate that the earlier generation judged the burden to be fair; it 
may even indicate that the earlier generation in good faith believed 
that the later generation would have agreed with the judgment of the 
earlier generation (bad it been possible to consult the later generation 
at the time the decision was made). 
This de facto guardianship on matters of public policy derives di-
rectly from the affection that parents and grandparents feel for their 
children and grandchildren; no binding mechanism of political process 
is needed to ensure that most parents vote for the well -being and 
prosperity of their children most of the time. But this also suggests an 
inherent limitation to the guardianship: Although parents may look 
out sharply for the interests of their children in the political process, it 
is doubtful that they are nearly so vigilant on matters that would affect 
their more distant descendants. Thus, a political proposal to reinstate 
compulsory military service might arouse strong passions among par-
ents of young chi ldren; a political proposal to limit the purchase of 
gasoline so that the earth's supply of crude oil will last for an addi-
tional 100 years might seem to those same parents as nothing more 
than a present economic burden that would benefit distant peoples for 
whom they have little concern. The notion that current generations 
inevitably will take the interests of future generations into account 
through parental concern and affection suggests at most that current 
generations will look one or two generations forward. 
But perhaps that is sufficient. Current and future generations over-
lap continuously, and the tie between current and future generations 
is continuously renewed as chi ldren grow to adults and have their own 
children. Peter Laslett and James Fishkin use the metaphor of a pro-
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cession to account for the relations between generations;182 that image 
has many implications-among them, the fact that each generation 
has immediate contact with its predecessor and its successor but not 
with the generations that more remotely precede or follow it. Be-
cause of this continuous contact in the procession, one can perhaps 
rely on the natural affection that earlier members in the procession 
have for immediately following members. If each generation looks 
out for the interests of the immediately following generation until that 
following generation is able to protect its own interests, the problem 
of equity between the generations will have been at least partly 
addressed. 
The prospects for relying on political processes for resolving in-
tergenerational concerns might be greater stil1 if each generation gen-
erally limits the scope of its policymaking, as much as possible, to 
policies having only temporary effects.l 83 As George Yin demon-
strates, temporary-effect lawmaking (such as reductions in income tax 
rates that expire after a stated number of years) may increase fiscal 
restraint responsibility by causing policymakers to take full account of 
the effects of their fiscal policy changes.184 Yin's pOint could be gener-
alized: If each generation were to limit its use of the political 
processes, as much as possible, to temporary-effect policymaking that 
extended no further into the future than the expected lives of that 
generation's children or grandchildren, we could have greater confi-
dence that the generation in control of the political process had taken 
into account many (possibly most) of the intergenerational interests 
affected by its policy decisions. At any rate, there will be less cause 
for concern that the ordinary processes for governance cannot resolve 
questions of fairness between the generations at least as well as they 
resolve questions of fairness within a single generation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Assessing fiscal policy from the perspective of intergenerational eq-
uity presents substantial problems. There are genuine limitations on 
our ability to measure intergenerational effects and, importantly, a 
fundamental arbitrariness in defining the relevant framework. Even a 
perfect measurement of intergenerational effects, however, remains 
182 Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin, Introduction: Processional Justice, in Justice Be-
tween Age Groups and Generations, note 90, at 11-14. 
18) See generally George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation and Fiscal Responsibility 
(unpublished manuscript); see also Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 247 (2007) (suggesling thatlemporary legislation should be lhe norm, rather than the 
exception , based on historical, analytic, and empirical evidence). 
184 Yin , note 183. 
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useless without a robust norm of intergenerational equity to evaluate 
whether those measured effects are fair. And yet the question is over-
whelmingly important. Fiscal policy affects people alive today and 
people who will be alive in the future, and we cannot responsibly 
make decisions about those policy matters in ignorance or disregard of 
how they affect future generations. The question of intergenerational 
equity in fiscal policy is hard ly misplaced even though we have no 
good answers. But, at a minimum, the bonds of affection between 
continuously overlapping generations suggest that, as with other as-
pects of government policy, the fiscal policy interests of the near fu-
ture generations can be taken into account through ordinary political 
processes. 
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